Judgments to Remember

CA(PHC)APN/0102/2024 (19.12.2025)
Divisional Bench

Bail Pending Appeal

Petitioner’s Argument  – Misapplication of Dachchaini v Attorney General (2005)

Held – The Dachchaini case (which suggested bail should be the rule) was overruled by the Supreme Court in AG v Letchchemi (2006)

S.C. Appeal No. 16/2021 (05.12.2025)

Issues

• • Whether the prosecution proved absence of consent beyond reasonable doubt
  • Whether the trial and appellate courts properly evaluated the evidence in law.

Findings & Reasoning

• • The Supreme Court affirmed that consent is not mere submission and must involve a conscious and voluntary agreement.
  • The complainant’s testimony was found credible and corroborated by Neighbour’s evidence, Medical evidence showing a fresh vaginal tear and Circumstances of forced entry and threats with a knife
  • The Court rejected the Appellant’s argument that the complainant’s conduct implied consent, holding that:
  • Courts must not rely on rape myths and stereotypes (e.g., expectation of resistance, screaming, or injuries).
  • If the court accepts the complainant’s evidence that she did not consent, there is no “third option” of implied consent.
  • The Court relied on comparative jurisprudence (Canada, UK, India) and emphasized that absence of resistance does not equal consent under Sri Lankan law.
  • The Appellant’s defence of prior intimacy and invitation was rejected as unsupported and inconsistent with accepted evidence

WRT/0146/22 (03.12.2025)

The petitioner, a Judicial Officer (Magistrate), challenged by way of writ of certiorari the decision of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), communicated by letter P-13 dated 10.07.2020, terminating her services. Two disciplinary inquiries had been conducted in relation to two charge sheets. The first concerned 14 charges relating to the disposal of confiscated sand, where the petitioner had ordered forfeited sand to be handed over to the Minuwangoda Municipal Council contrary to JSC Circulars regulating the disposal of confiscated property. The second concerned four charges relating to the improper remand of a suspect, whom the petitioner repeatedly remanded for disorderly behaviour despite a favourable psychiatric report, resulting in prolonged deprivation of liberty. Following the inquiries, the JSC concluded that the petitioner was not a fit and proper person to hold judicial office and dismissed her. The prayer for mandamus was abandoned at the hearing.

The Court first considered the issue of laches, noting that the application had been filed nearly two years after the termination. The delay was held to be unexplained and unreasonable. Since the termination order was not a nullity but, at most, voidable, the delay was fatal to the discretionary remedy of certiorari. The Court nevertheless considered the substantive issues and rejected the contention that judicial orders are wholly immune from disciplinary scrutiny. While ordinary errors of law should generally be corrected through appeal or revision, egregious conduct, gross ignorance, recklessness, or repeated serious errors may constitute judicial misconduct warranting disciplinary action. Comparative jurisprudence from Sri Lanka, India, Canada and the United States was considered in support of this principle.

In relation to the confiscated sand, the Court held that disposal of property after forfeiture is an administrative function rather than a judicial act, and that the JSC Circulars regulating such disposal were lawful and binding. The petitioner had admitted violating the Circulars on at least 13 occasions, attributing the conduct to ignorance and reliance on her predecessor. The Court found that this demonstrated gross ignorance, incompetence and disregard of basic administrative responsibilities, bringing the judiciary into disrepute. In respect of the remand charges, the Court held that repeatedly depriving a person of liberty without adequate justification, particularly despite a favourable psychiatric report, constituted serious misconduct. The power of remand is a grave judicial power requiring careful scrutiny, and mechanical or reckless exercise of that power may amount to a violation of fundamental rights.

On proportionality, the Court emphasised that judicial officers are held to a higher standard of conduct and that maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice is paramount. Considering the repeated violations concerning the disposal of confiscated property together with the serious misuse of remand powers, the Court held that dismissal was justified and proportionate. Accordingly, the application was dismissed both on the ground of laches and, on the merits, on the basis that the JSC’s decision to terminate the petitioner was lawful and justified, with no order as to costs.

 CA (Writ) Application No. 209/2022 (19.12.2025)

The Petitioner, who was serving in the rank of Leading Infantry of the Sri Lanka Navy (Regular Force) with a period of 16 years 09 months of service in the Sri Lanka Navy, has been dismissed without disgrace consequent to a Summary Trial held against him.

The Court held that the Petitioner has established that the Summary Trial conducted against the Petitioner and his consequent dismissal from service by the Sri Lanka Navy were unreasonable, illegal and ultra vires the provisions of the Navy Act and the SLNO 0501

CA WRIT Application No.388/2022 (18.12.2025)

The Petitioners, operators of “The Coffee Bungalow Kandy”, a heritage property, challenged the construction of the “Grand Serendib Hotel” at Mahamaya Mawatha, Kandy, alleging serious violations of UDA planning and building regulations, including excessive height, floor area and plot coverage, and the misuse of “basements”, as well as structural and environmental risks within the Kandy World Heritage City. They relied on a seven-member investigation committee report (P34), obtained through RTI, which identified several regulatory breaches and recommended disciplinary action and demolition. Despite their objections, the UDA issued a Development Permit and subsequently a Certificate of Conformity (COC).

The Court held that the Petitioners had no enforceable legal right to an uninterrupted scenic view, as such a servitude could not arise merely through long enjoyment. The Court also found that the application, filed in 2022 although construction had commenced around 2015, was defeated by delay and laches; continued complaints to public authorities did not justify the prolonged inaction. Further, the P34 report could not be relied upon, as the committee had not been appointed by the UDA Board as required by law and the report had been prepared without a site inspection or affording the affected parties an opportunity to be heard, thereby offending principles of natural justice.

The Court further observed that the disputed matters concerning the slope, floor-area ratio, height, basements and compliance with planning requirements involved substantial factual disputes which could not appropriately be determined in writ proceedings on affidavit evidence. Mandamus was also unavailable because the UDA did not owe the Petitioners a specific public duty capable of enforcement through that remedy. Finally, after the COC had been issued, demolition under Section 28A required clear proof that the construction was contrary to the approved permit, which had not been established. Accordingly, the Petitioners failed to obtain the relief sought.

 CA/PHC/0028/2021 (03.12.2025)

The mere fact that the dispute that has arisen between the parties is one with regard to the possession of a paddy land, does not in any manner, oust the jurisdiction of a Magistrate vested in him by Part VII of the Primary Courts Procedure Act No. 44 of 1979, by the provisions of the Agrarian Development Act of 46 of 2000 except only when it relates to a dispute with regard to the tenurial rights of a tenant cultivator.

CA/PHC/0190/2018 (02.12.2025)

Under the State Lands (Recovery of Possession) Act No. 7 of 1979, the Appellants contended that the disputed land was not State land but had been privately possessed by their family for a long period. They further argued that the applications for ejectment were defective for failure to comply with the prescribed Forms B and C, and relied on documents such as NICs, utility bills and electoral registers to establish longstanding possession. The Court, however, held that under Sections 3–10 of the Act, the competent authority’s opinion that the land is State land is conclusive at the ejectment stage and cannot be challenged before the Magistrate. The only valid defence available to an occupier is to establish possession under a valid State-issued permit or written authority.

The Court emphasised that the Magistrate is not entitled to require the competent authority to produce evidence supporting its opinion. Referring to Farook v. Gunewardene (1980), Senanayake v. Damunupola (1982) and subsequent Court of Appeal and Provincial High Court decisions, the Court reaffirmed that the Act provides a speedy and summary procedure for recovery of State land, while disputes concerning the identity of the land or ownership must be pursued separately under Section 12 by way of civil action. As the Appellants failed to establish possession under any valid State permit or written authority, their contention that the land was not State land was legally untenable. The Magistrate and High Court had therefore correctly ordered ejectment, and the appeal was dismissed.

 CA/HCC/0229-2018 (12.12.2025)

It was also argued that the learned High Court Judge has failed to call the defense of the accused-appellant as per Section 200(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act.

The Court observed that It is true that the learned trial Judge has not expressly recorded compliance with Section 200(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act. Nevertheless, all three accused were represented by an Attorney-at-Law throughout the trial. It is noteworthy that they were well aware of their right to call evidence and were, in fact, afforded the opportunity to do so. Had the trial Judge not formed the view that there were grounds to proceed with the trial after the close of the prosecution case, or had he failed to explain to the accused their right to lead evidence, there would have been no necessity for counsel to tender a list of witnesses intended to be called on behalf of the accused. More importantly, given the strength of the prosecution evidence, any reasonable trial Judge could not have done anything other than call for the defence.

In these circumstances, the mere absence of a recorded explanation under Section 200(1) cannot, by itself, be construed as causing prejudice to the accused.

CA/HCC/0203/2020 (19.12.2025)

Procedural lapses in police raid:

• • Odometer readings not recorded; later inserted inconsistently.
  • No sealing equipment carried despite prior knowledge of narcotics raid.
  • Contradictory accounts of raid location (bus stand vs. junction).
  • Inaccurate or missing notes on weapons, cash, and timings.

Chain of custody compromised:

• • Productions initially rejected by Government Analyst due to damaged cover (8 cm opening allowed tampering).
  • Weight discrepancy of 12.33 grams between police and analyst records.
  • Productions kept in officer’s personal locker for two days before submission.
  • Missing signatures and irregular entries in police records.

The Court emphasized that officers involved in narcotics raids must maintain accurate and contemporaneous notes of their actions. These notes are not a mere formality but a safeguard to ensure the reliability of evidence.

The Court stressed that maintaining proper records is vital to proving the chain of custody of narcotics. Without reliable notes, the possibility of tampering or contamination cannot be excluded

CA/HCC/0157/2023 (02.12.2025)

Improbabilities in Prosecution Evidence

• • Informant unnecessarily exposed in public despite knowing vehicle registration number.
  • Informant allegedly entered David Pieris Company where recipients were waiting—highly improbable.
  • Appellant not searched at arrest; three-wheeler and building not searched.
  • Drugs not sealed or field-tested immediately, despite opportunities.
  • Chain of custody questionable (productions kept by PW1 for two days).

Contradictions

• • PW1 and PW11 gave inconsistent accounts of information received and raid details.
  • Credibility of official witnesses undermined.

Burden of Proof

• • Trial Judge wrongly shifted burden to appellant, stating he failed to prove suggestions made in cross-examination.
  • Court emphasized prosecution must prove case beyond reasonable doubt; defence has no duty to explain.

CA/HCC/139/2024 (02.12.2025)

• • Counts 1 & 2: Grave sexual abuse under Section 365 B(2)(b) of the Penal Code.
  • Count 3: Sexual harassment under Section 345 of the Penal Code.

The High Court convicted the Appellant on all counts, sentencing him to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment for each of the first two counts and 2 years for the third, to run concurrently .

The Incidents – The victim, a close relative of the Appellant, described three specific instances of misconduct:

• • First Incident: The Appellant touched the victim’s chest by inserting his hand into her T-shirt while they were watching television.
  • Second Incident: The Appellant touched the victim’s genital area over her clothes while lying on a bed and kissing her ear.
  • Third Incident: The Appellant hugged the victim from behind as she was leaving a room after washing

Court of Appeal Analysis

The primary legal question was whether “mere touching” constitutes Grave Sexual Abuse. The Court referred to established legal precedents, noting that:

• • Grave sexual abuse must involve acts “more serious than a touch” and must be of a “very high degree” that falls just short of rape.
  • Section 365B is intended for graver situations; therefore, touching the chest or genital area over clothing does not meet this threshold

HCC 175/23 (09.12.2025)

Original Indictment: The Appellant was charged with three counts of grave sexual abuse under Section 365 B (2) (b) of the Penal Code, committed against a 14-year-old victim between 2012 and 20133 (09.12.2025)

failure to Disclose Evidence (Fair Trial Violation)

• • The prosecution failed to provide the court or the defense with a second statement recorded from the victim on March 3, 2015.
  • This statement was ordered by the Attorney General specifically because there were contradictory positions in the victim’s first statement.
  • The Court of Appeal ruled that withholding this statement violated the Appellant’s right to a fair trial under Article 13(3) of the Constitution, as the prosecutor has a duty to disclose all relevant facts, including those favorable to the accused

Related Charges and Double Jeopardy

• • The Appellant had already pleaded guilty to a lesser charge of sexual harassment (Section 345) in a separate case (HCR/38/2017) involving the same victim and incident.
  • The prosecution had used the same Medico-Legal Report (MLR) for both cases.
  • The Court found that since the prosecution had already reduced the rape charge to sexual harassment based on the MLR in the other case, they should not have pursued the grave sexual abuse charges in this case

CA (CPA) 47/2025 (12.12.2025)
State Land Recovery Act

The Sri Lanka Ports Authority initiated proceedings in the Magistrate’s Court of Galle to evict the Petitioner from a “State Land”. The Petitioner challenged the eviction on two primary grounds:

Ownership Dispute: He claimed the land was not State Land under the Ports Authority’s control but belonged to the Forest Conservation Department.

Authority Challenge: He argued the Respondent was not a “Competent Authority” because they failed to submit written approval from the Minister or proof of general/special authority at the time of filing

Key Findings of the Court

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application based on the following legal principles:

• • Limited Scope of Inquiry: Under Section S. 9 (1) of the Act, a person summoned cannot contest the “opinion” of the Competent Authority that a land is State Land. The only valid defense is to produce a valid permit or written authority from the State, which the Petitioner failed to do.
  • Speedy Recovery: The Court emphasized that “urgency” is the hallmark of the Act, intended to provide a summary mode for the State to recover possession without protracted trials
  • Presumption of Regularity: Regarding the Competent Authority’s status, the Court applied the maxim Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta (all official acts are presumed correctly performed). It ruled that the Authority does not need to produce ministerial approval at the time of filing.
  • Procedural Bar: The Court held that the Petitioner could not invoke the “parallel revisionary jurisdiction” of the Court of Appeal after having already exhausted the same remedy at the High Court level