Judgments to Remember
Essential takeaways from recent court decisions
Explore concise breakdowns of landmark judicial pronouncements, rulings, and evolving legal interpretations that are shaping modern jurisprudence
2026
January
CA/PHC/163/2020 (14.01.2026)
The Assistant Commissioner of Labour (Respondent) filed certificates in the Magistrate’s Court to recover alleged arrears for EPF (Rs. 5,595,436.49) and gratuity (Rs. 1,325,001.08) on behalf of a workman. The workman claimed he was employed by the Appellant’s UAE branch from 1990 to 2011. The Appellant denied the employment of the workman.
The court ruled that establishing a clear employer-employee relationship is a fundamental requirement before the summary recovery mechanism can be triggered. The documents provided by the Labour Department—primarily uncertified photocopies and records from foreign entities—failed to prove the Appellant was the actual employer.
CA (PHC) 182/2020 (13.01.2026)
The Attorney-at-Law who attested the Respondent’s affidavit (acting as a Commissioner for Oaths) later appeared as the counsel for that same Respondent in the proceedings. Section 12(2) of the Ordinance expressly prohibits a Commissioner for Oaths from exercising their powers in any matter where they are the attorney-at-law to any of the parties.
The court ruled that this was not a “technicality” but a substantive illegality that struck at the integrity of the proceedings . Because the attestation was a nullity, the affidavit could not serve as lawful evidence
CA (PHC) 0115/2017 (23.01.2026)
The Divisional Secretary, Medadumbara (Appellant), filed an application before the Magistrate’s Court of Theldeniya under Section 5 of the State Lands (Recovery of Possession) Act No. 07 of 1979 (as amended) seeking the eviction of S.M.R. Samarakoon (Respondent) from a land described as State land. The Magistrate (15.07.2011) upheld the Respondent’s position and dismissed the eviction application, holding that since the land had been acquired for a road widening project, action should have been taken under Section 42 of the Land Acquisition Act, relying on Edwin v. Thillakaratne (2001).
The earlier view that recovery must proceed under the Land Acquisition Act (Section 42) was held to be incorrect. The Court reaffirmed that the State Lands (Recovery of Possession) Act can be used even where land was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act.
CA/HCC/ 0081/2018 (26.01.2026)
An Audit Report was accepted as a fresh evidence in the Appeal
CA HCC 105-106/2022 (21.01.2026)
The learned High Court Judge has erred by failing to identify the essential elements for actus reus and mens rea and more specifically the particular limb of the offence for which the appellants have been convicted of in the disputed judgment.
Furthermore, the learned High Court Judge has also neglected to adequately compare the testimony of the prosecution witnesses against applicable law, thereby failing to present a logical basis for the disputed judgment.
SC Appeal No. 138/19 (22.01.2026)
Bribery
The contradictions identified by the Court of Appeal concerned where the raiding officers were positioned during the trap, not whether money was accepted. The Supreme Court held that discrepancy was minor and peripheral.
S.C. Appeal No. 169/2019 (30.01.2026)
Following the 1st accused’s arrest, he led police to an isolated area approximately 500 meters from his residence, where the deceased’s body was found in a shallow grave. The body had a fatal cut injury to the neck.
The Court applied the Ellenborough dictum, noting that since the 1st accused had exclusive knowledge of the burial site and was last seen with the deceased, his failure to provide an innocent explanation supported an inference of guilt
CA (Writ) Application No. 839/2024 (23.01.2026)
Eleven inmates were killed during the riot. An inquest was held in the Magistrate’s Court of Welisara (Case No. B 3118/20). On 26.04.2023, the Magistrate concluded that the deaths were caused by gunshot injuries and directed the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) to take appropriate steps under the Criminal Procedure Code. After investigations, the CID forwarded material to the Attorney General. By letter dated 30.08.2024, the Attorney General advised that no further action was necessary, stating that prison and STF officers had acted lawfully., force used was within legal limits and there was insufficient evidence to identify specific officers responsible for the deaths.
The Court of Appeal held that, an inquest is limited to determining the “apparent cause of death” under the Code of Criminal Procedure Act. It is not a criminal trial. A Magistrate’s finding at an inquest does not determine guilt. Directions made during an inquest do not override the Attorney General’s prosecutorial powers. The Magistrate had determined that deaths were caused by firearm injuries, but that finding alone did not establish criminal liability against specific individuals.
The Attorney General has constitutional and statutory discretion to decide whether to prosecute. Courts will not interfere unless the decision is illegal, irrational, Mala fide or Arbitrary
CA CPA-020/25 (20.01.2026)
Suspended Sentence for possession and trafficking of 1.23g of drugs.
Court of Appeal held that, the High Court Judge imposed a suspended sentence below the statutory minimum but failed to provide sufficient legal justification for departing from the mandatory minimum. Accordingly, the sentence was illegal and not in accordance with the law.
CPA/135/2024 (12.01.2026)
Under Article 154P(3)(b) of the Constitution, the Provincial High Court exercises revisionary jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of Appeal. The court ruled that once a party has invoked the revisionary jurisdiction of the High Court, they cannot seek a “second tier” of review by filing another revision in the Court of Appeal for the same matter.
CA/CPA/0098/2022 (23.01.2026)
The core issue was whether the Court of Appeal possesses the jurisdiction to revise an interlocutory order made by a Provincial High Court exercising its appellate jurisdiction over a Labour Tribunal matter. The Court of Appeal determined it lacks the authority to hear the revision application, as the proper forum for such a challenge is the Supreme Court with special leave to appeal
CA (PHC) APN/0073/23 (30.01.2025)
The Petitioner pleaded guilty to charges under the Public Property Act No. 12 of 1982 across multiple High Court cases (HC/102/17 through HC/124/17). The resulting sentences included varying terms of rigorous imprisonment. The total aggregated sentence across all cases amounted to 37 years. The Petitioner’s counsel requested that the court order all sentences to run concurrently. The court noted that under Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when a person already undergoing imprisonment is sentenced in a subsequent case, the new sentence must commence at the expiration of the previous one.
February
WRT 354/2022 (03.02.2026)
The Petitioner (former President) challenged an order of the Fort Magistrate issuing summons against him in a private plaint.
The Court held that once tabled in Parliament, the COI report becomes a public document, therefore, private individuals can rely on it to file complaints under Section 136(1)(a). However, in the instant matter, the learned Magistrate did not specify what material was relied upon and how ingredients of offences were satisfied before the summons were issued. The learned Magistrate had appeared to act as a “rubber stamp”, which is impermissible.
SC/APPEAL/162/2019 (06.02.2026)
Judgment on revocation of a Deed of Gift on the ground of gross ingratitude
SC/APPEAL/140/2019 (13.02 2026)
66 Application
The Supreme Court clarified that Primary Courts have jurisdiction over “disputes affecting land” (including temples) to prevent breaches of the peace, regardless of whether the dispute involves a trust or State land. Even if the priest was an “agent” of a Board, the principle that an agent’s possession is the principal’s possession does not apply when the dispute is between the agent and the principal in these specific preventive proceedings.
The Court specifically held that under Section 66(2) of the Primary Courts’ Procedure Act, once information is filed—whether by the police or a private party—the Primary Court is automatically vested with jurisdiction to inquire into and determine the matter.
S.C. Miscellaneous No. 02/2011 (20.02.2026)
The Court found that the Appellant filed a “Notice of Hearing” (Form 1) instead of the required “Notice of Appeal” (Form 4). The Court ruled that Rule 28(3) is mandatory.
Under relevant by-laws, a gem mining license requires proof of ownership or consent from two-thirds of the land’s owners. The Court found that a field inspection and deed reviews revealed significant discrepancies in the boundaries and identity of the land (the corpus). Court noted that even if a license had been issued previously (in 2006) based on an erroneous decision or mistake of fact, the Authority was duty-bound to reconsider and correct the matter.
CA (PHC) APN 0140/24 (20.02.2026)
The prosecution intended to lead CCTV recordings as evidence and provided notice to the defense under the Evidence (Special Provisions) Act No. 14 of 1995. The defense argued the prosecution failed to provide an expert report (e.g., from Moratuwa University) to prove the footage was not tampered with, as required by the Evidence (Special Provisions) Act. The High Court Judge upheld a defense objection and refused to allow the prosecution to play the CCTV recordings.
The court found that Section 4(1) of the Evidence (Special Provisions) Act does not explicitly require an expert’s analysis or report for electronic evidence to be admissible. The Court further ruled that reliability and tampering concerns should be addressed at the end of the trial after weighing all evidence, rather than being used to block the admissibility of the evidence prematurely.
Citing legal precedent, the court noted that the “best evidence rule” has been whittled down; the non-production of an original or a lack of scientific voice/image identification may affect the weight of the evidence but does not automatically make it inadmissible.
CA (PHC)0054/2019 (11.02.2026)
Relisting of an Appeal. A “sufficient cause” is required.
HCC/0077-0078/2022 (13.02.2026)
Identification by voice.
CA-HCC 228/2020 (11.02.2026)
The Court held that consolidating trials against a single accused for similar offences is impermissible and renders a conviction illegal.
CA/HCC/0260-261/2024 (09.20.2026)
The Court of Appeal reaffirmed that in money laundering cases, once the prosecution establishes that an investment could not have been made from known income, the burden shifts to the accused to prove the contrary on a balance of probabilities (per Section 4 of the Act).
The Court rejected the argument that leading evidence of previous convictions caused “great prejudice”. It ruled that under the Evidence Ordinance, previous convictions are relevant when bad character is a fact in issue or to establish the “basic fact” of acquisitions beyond known means.
CA/HCC/0087/2016 (12.02.2026)
Cheating
The Court found that as a subordinate Salaries Clerk, the Appellant was at the lowest level of the administrative hierarchy. The salary disbursement process involved multiple levels of verification, including the Accounts Division, the Accountant, the Assistant Director General, and the Director General .
Because senior officers (such as the Accountant and Shroff) authorized and signed the documents, they carried legal and administrative accountability for the contents. The Court ruled it “legally not plausible” to impose exclusive criminal liability on the clerk while superior officers escaped liability for their failure in oversight .
CA(PHC) 0105/2018 (20.02.2026)
It was argued that the petition of appeal lacked a specific statement of the matter of law to be argued and did not include a certificate from an Attorney-at-Law certifying it as a fit question for adjudication.
The Court found that the preliminary objection was “very much belated”. The Court noted that although the formal certificate was missing, the Appellants had clearly and unambiguously set out the matters of law in paragraph 8 (i) to (xxvi) of their petition and that the procedural lapse did not cause them any prejudice to the Respondent.
C.A. (PHC) Application No. 64/2021 (20.02.2026)
State Lands (Recovery of Possession) Act No. 7 of 1979
The Petitioner argued the proceedings were “fatally defective” because the initial quit notice (Form A) specified an extent of 0.09 hectares, while the subsequent court application (Form B) referred to 3.6 hectares.
The Court of Appeal found that the discrepancy in the land’s extent was a technical or formal irregularity rather than a jurisdictional defect.
CA/BOR/0001/2023 (20.02.2026)
The Court emphasized that under Section 45 of the Land Acquisition Act, the market value must be determined as the amount the land would realize if sold by a “willing seller” in the open market on the date of the Gazette notice (April 25, 1989).
March
SC Appeal No. 93/2023 (17.03.2026)
The Appellant (1st Accused) and others were university students involved in a ragging incident on 06th October 1997 at the University of Peradeniya. The deceased, a first-year student, was forced to perform excessive physical exercises (“Thoppu Karanam”/sit-ups). Despite visible exhaustion and collapse, the Appellant compelled the deceased to continue. The deceased later developed acute renal failure due to rhabdomyolysis caused by extreme exertion and died. The High Court found the Accused guilty.
The Supreme Court ruled that forced physical exertion was dangerous and unlawful, But not inherently or imminently lethal in the ordinary course of nature. The death resulted through a progressive medical condition (rhabdomyolysis → renal failure) which was not an immediate or almost certain fatal act. The Appellant could be attributed knowledge that harm or death was likely but not knowledge that death was almost certain.
Death sentence was reduced to Culpable Homicide not amounting to Murder.
SC/APPEAL/103/2021 (31.03.2026)
Confiscation under Mines and Mineral Act
Referring to of forfeiture under Section 63B(1) the Supreme Court observed that the term “may” indicates that forfeiture is discretionary, not mandatory. However, such discretion must be exercised judicially after inquiry, especially regarding the owner’s knowledge, and their conduct. Even though the Act does not expressly require proof of precautions,
the Court must assess whether the owner had knowledge (actual or inferred), and whether the owner acted as a reasonable and prudent person.
SC Contempt Application No. 02/2024 (16.03.2026)
The Respondent AAL had allegedly torn pages from a court record and chewed them in court. She was disenrolled. However, the Respondent had Continued to practice law despite being suspended by the Supreme Court specifically: opening her office, meeting clients, giving legal advice, charging fees, holding herself out as an Attorney-at-Law.
The Supreme Court emphasized not every criticism of the judiciary amounts to contempt. Fair criticism made in good faith is permissible. However, contempt arises where conduct scandalizes the Court, or creates a real risk of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice. While intention is relevant, the Court noted even absent explicit malice, objective tendency to interfere with justice is sufficient.
April
CA/HCC/0087/2021 (02.04.2026)
In the present case, although the injuries are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, the evidence does not lead to the conclusion that the Appellant acted with a murderous intention. However, the Learned Trial Judge has failed to distinguish between murderous intention and knowledge and has erroneously arrived at a finding of murder solely on the basis of the evidence of the JMO, who stated that the injuries were intentional.
The Court held that the surrounding circumstances did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the Appellant intended to kill the deceased. The Court considered several important factors: the assault occurred suddenly in anger; there was no premeditation; moderate force was used; the deceased did not die immediately; her advanced age and illnesses contributed to death; the death occurred five days later due to cumulative complications.
Accordingly, the Court found that the evidence demonstrated knowledge rather than murderous intention.
CA PHC/06/21 (28.04.2026)
The principal issue was whether the Central Environmental Authority had statutory authority to institute criminal proceedings for offences under Section 23A of the National Environmental Act.
After examining the Act, the Court found that there was no express provision empowering the CEA to institute criminal proceedings before a Magistrate’s Court.
CA/(PHC) 115/18 (30.04.2026)
State Lands (Recovery of Possession) Act
The Respondent appeared before Court and raised several preliminary objections, namely: the land belonged to the Land Reform Commission; the Land Reform Commission had transferred the land to the Respondent by Deed No. 218 dated 13.02.2009; therefore, the Respondent was not illegally occupying State land.
the Court held that the issue of land identity can and must be examined for the limited purpose of determining whether the written authority relates to the disputed State land. The Court of Appeal held that a proper inquiry under Section 9(1) of the State Lands (Recovery of Possession) Act was mandatory and had not been conducted.
CA NO.RTI/01/2025 (02.04.2026)
The case involved an appeal by People’s Bank (the Public Authority) against a decision by the Right to Information (RTI) Commission. The Commission had ordered the bank to disclose information regarding two accounts held by the Devinuwara Uthpalawanna Sri Vishnu Maha Dewalaya. The bank refused, arguing that the information was private, protected by banking secrecy laws, and that disclosure would violate a fiduciary relationship.
The Court emphasized Section 4 of the RTI Act, which contains a “notwithstanding” clause. This means the RTI Act prevails over any other conflicting written law, including the secrecy provisions of the Banking Act. The Court clarified that the duty to disclose temple-related funds applies regardless of whether the money is held in a public or private bank. The nature of the funds (public trust), not the nature of the institution, dictates the disclosure.
May
CA (PHC) 124/2022 (05.05.2026)
This matter concerned the interim custody of a vehicle produced before the Magistrate’s Court as a production in criminal proceedings, and whether the vehicle should be released to the Absolute Owner (L.B. Finance PLC), or the Registered Owner.
The Court emphasized that proprietary rights remain vested in the lessor notwithstanding possession by another person. Accordingly, L.B. Finance possessed a legally recognized proprietary right superior to anyone merely using or possessing the vehicle.
CA HCC 226/23 (04.05.2026)
Grave Sexual Abuse
The Court of Appeal found several critical errors in how the High Court handled the evidence, i.e. the Court noted it was highly illogical for the appellant to commit such an act in a shared room where other monks were awake, rather than using his own private, allocated room, Material Inconsistencies, failure to call material witnesses and improper evaluation of defence evidence.
CA (PHC) 148/2020 (05.05.2026)
Statutory Weight of the Certificate: Under Section 38(3) of the EPF Act, a certificate issued by the Commissioner serves as sufficient evidence that the specified sum is due. The Magistrate is not required to re-examine the correctness of the calculations or demand supporting documentation
Directors Can Be “Employees”: The Court rejected the Appellant’s argument that the case was unmaintainable because the 2nd Respondent was a company director. Holding a directorship does not automatically exclude someone from being an “employee” under the EPF Act if they function under a contract of service and receive remuneration.
CPA 69/2025 (18.05.2026)
When the matter came up, a pivotal question arose as to whether the Court of Appeal has the jurisdiction to review an order made by a Provincial High Court when that High Court was itself exercising concurrent revisionary jurisdiction over a Magistrate’s Court order
The Court rejected the Petitioner’s arguments that previous binding precedents were decided per incuriam (through lack of care). It concluded that the Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction to sit in revision over a revisionary order of the Provincial High Court, making the application legally unmaintainable.
CA/CPA/0102/25 (22.05.2026)
No revisionary jurisdiction can be invoked with the Court of Appeal as against an Order made by the Provincial High Court in the exercise of its Appellate Jurisdiction.
CA HCC 130/24 (25.05.2026)
Aiding and Abetting
The 1st accused deceived PW01 and took her to a house in the Mapalagama area to commit the offence. On the way, the 1st accused encountered the appellant (who was on the road to play a sport with others) and asked him where the house keys were. The appellant replied that the keys were “on the door”. After this brief exchange, the appellant stayed behind to continue his sport, did not accompany the 1st accused to the house, did not let them in, and did not explain the layout of the house.
The Court of Appeal held that to establish guilt for abetment under Section 100 of the Penal Code, the prosecution must prove direct, active involvement through either instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aid. The accused must actively intend to provoke or aid the crime, and mere knowledge of the offense or abstention from interfering is insufficient. The Court found that the appellant took no concrete, premeditated action to ensure the incident commenced, nor did he provide pre-planned assistance. The testimony portrayed the appellant merely as a “passive observer or a reluctant informant”. By answering the question and consciously distancing himself from the 1st accused’s subsequent actions, he demonstrated a lack of intent to provoke or actively aid the offense. Consequently, the conviction could not be sustained.
HCC 345-346-19 (19.05.2026)
Under Section 11(b) of the Evidence Ordinance, the Court found the prosecution’s timeline highly improbable. It was illogical that a police officer would finish a 12-hour consecutive shift, immediately resume duty for an unspecified assignment without urgent information, and personally fund a private rental vehicle for a raid. The police failed to maintain mandatory records and taking the productions to the Police Narcotics Bureau for weighing during this raid, whereas a previous raid’s productions were taken directly to the local police station was observed to be unusual.
RTI/01/2024 (08.05.2026)
The Court ruled that an examinee has a fundamental right to access their own evaluated answer sheets. Citing regional jurisprudence, the Court noted that an evaluated answer script constitutes “information” and contains the “opinion” of the examiner, meaning it cannot be withheld from the candidate who wrote it. Transparency and accountability must override “hide-and-seek games” in higher education institutions
S.C. TAB No. 03A-03C/2017 (06.05.2026)
Vithya Murder Case
On 13.05.2015, an 18-year-old schoolgirl, Sivaloganathan Vithya, was intercepted, abducted, gang-raped, and murdered in Pungudutivu, Jaffna. A Trial at Bar initially found the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 9th accused guilty of multiple counts, including conspiracy to abduct, gang rape, and murder.
Areas discussed – Conspiracy, Accomplice, Alibi, Corroboration
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals of the 4th and 8th accused, setting aside their convictions. The only evidence against them was a solitary sighting of them sitting in a van with the 9th accused the day prior to the murder, watching Vithya. The Court ruled that while this raised strong and justifiable suspicion, it did not meet the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required to establish criminal conspiracy or active complicity.
June
SC/APPEAL/161/2023 (01.06.2026)
The case arises from the highly publicized issuance of treasury bonds by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka between 1st February, 2015 and 31st March, 2016, which allegedly caused billions of rupees in losses to the State.
The indictment contains 22 charges. Count Nos. 1–2 charge the accused company with conspiracy and the substantive offence of criminal misappropriation of treasury bonds under Section 5(1) of the Offences Against Public Property Act, No. 12 of 1982. Count Nos. 3–11 charge the remaining accused with aiding and abetting the accused.
Before the trial proper commenced, the accused raised a preliminary objection stating that the accused, as an incorporated body (not a natural person), cannot be charged under the Offences Against Public Property Act. On 06th December, 2021 the Trial-at-Bar upheld this objection and discharged all accused from Count Nos. 1–11.
The Attorney General filed a revision application in the Court of Appeal, which dismissed it in limine for lack of jurisdiction. The Attorney General then sought special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held that order of Trial-at-Bar of discharge was appealable directly to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court further held that the High Court-at-Bar erred in discharging the accused. A corporate entity can be charged under the Offences Against Public Property Act.
SC Appeal No. 147/2018 (11.06.2026)
The Supreme Court found that under Section 70 of the Mines and Minerals Act No. 33 of 1992, the definition of a “mineral” explicitly includes salt. Because all works, machinery, plant, and premises used to extract the edible salt are situated within the Southern Province, the activity constitutes a mining activity within the province. Thus, the Southern Provincial Council acted within its lawful powers to levy the tax.
HCC/272/2019 (25.06.2026)
Under Section 113A(1) of the Penal Code, the offense of conspiracy fundamentally requires an agreement between two or more persons. Citing King v Dharmasena, the Court emphasized that if two or more specific individuals are accused of conspiracy and all but one are acquitted, the lone remaining accused cannot be convicted of conspiracy, as one person cannot conspire with themselves.
CA/HCC/0215/2025 (26.06.2026)
Right of Private defence
The right of private defense extends to voluntarily causing death if the assault reasonably causes an apprehension that death or grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence. The right commences the moment a reasonable, objective apprehension of danger arises from a threat or attempt, and it lasts as long as that apprehension persists. Force applied after the threat has ceased (out of revenge or vindictiveness) falls outside this protection. Necessity and Proportionality, Burden of Proof, Presence of Imminent Threat, No Recourse to Public Authorities, Proportionate Reaction without Premeditation were analyzed.
CA HCC 0116/2024 (22.06.2026)
Statutory Rape
During the trial, the High Court Judge disallowed a crucial question posed by the defense regarding the victim’s history/narrative, dismissing it as an inadmissible character-prejudicing question.
The Court of Appeal found that because the victim’s medical history involved two different names (“Sali” and “Bega”), the defense had a fundamental right to thoroughly cross-examine her to uncover potential contradictions or distortions. Blocking this line of questioning severely flawed the trial process.
CA/HCC/0064/2023 (15.06.2026)
The Additional Solicitor General (ASG) informed the Court that because the firearm in question was never actually produced before the trial court, the charge carrying a life imprisonment penalty under the Firearms Ordinance could not be legally maintained.
CA/HCC/0042/2025 (30.06.2026)
Following his initial arrest in 2016, the appellant was diagnosed with schizophrenia and underwent treatment. A subsequent medical report on April 12, 2016, declared him fit to plead and stand trial
During the High Court trial, multiple defense counsels withdrew from the case, citing an inability to secure adequate instructions due to the appellant’s mental illness. Consequently, an application was made on May 14, 2024, requesting a voir dire inquiry to determine his current mental capacity to stand trial. The High Court Judge denied this request because no updated medical report was submitted, the prosecution did not agree to it, and the trial was in its final stages
The Court of Appeal found that the High Court Judge failed to properly consider the mandatory provisions of Section 375 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act No. 15 of 1979. The court held that omitting to decide on a preliminary issue regarding the current mental condition of an accused when properly raised vitiates the entire trial.
CA/CPA/0023/23 (19.06.2026)
The legal issue was whether the orders made by the Provincial High Courts in Writ Applications can be canvassed before the Court of Appeal in Revision.
The court verified that while the Provincial High Court does share “concurrent” or “parallel” original writ jurisdiction with the Court of Appeal, this equivalence does not extend to appellate or revisionary jurisdiction.
The court concluded that the Court of Appeal retains exclusive appellate and revisionary control over the final orders and judgments delivered by a Provincial High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court of Appeal holds full jurisdiction to entertain the revision application.
CA/HCC/293-295/2025 (12.06.2026)
The three convicted individuals (the Appellants) appealed to the Court of Appeal. On 27.05.2026, the Court of Appeal initially dismissed the appeal and affirmed the death sentences
On the same day, the Counsel for the Appellants filed a motion seeking permission to make an application to set aside the 27.05.2026 judgment, arguing that it had been delivered per incuriam (through inadvertence) because it failed to account for a critical error regarding the statutory definition and composition of an unlawful assembly.
The court observed that the original indictment exclusively named the 16 accused and omitted any reference to “unknown persons.” Because 13 individuals were acquitted, only 3 individuals (the Appellants) remained convicted. This reduced the assembly’s count below the statutory minimum of five required by Section 138 of the Penal Code.
The Court of Appeal found that its initial judgment on 27.05.2026 had completely overlooked the specific wording of the indictment and failed to apply binding judicial precedents. This omission went to the very root of the legal reasoning and outcome of the case. Satisfied that the previous judgment was delivered per incuriam, the Court of Appeal exercised its inherent jurisdiction to recall and set aside its 27.05.2026 ruling. The court allowed the appeal and formally acquitted the , , and Accused-Appellants of all charges to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
July
CA/CPA/0054/2024 (17.07.2026)
The Accused-Petitioner filed a revision application in the Court of Appeal against the High Court Order dated 05-02-2024, which had refused to grant him bail under Section 15B of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Act No. 12 of 2022. The Petitioner was indicted in the High Court of Colombo on 20-09-2012 as the 3rd Accused, facing 115 charges under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and 115 charges under Emergency Regulations, alongside a list of 106 witnesses. The Petitioner was arrested on or around 09-08-2009 and had spent roughly 15 to 16 years in detention without a concluded trial.
The Court held that the 2022 Amendment (Section 15B) created an express exception to mandatory remand under Section 15(2), conferring jurisdiction on the High Court to grant bail upon exceptional circumstances. The High Court Judge erred by failing to consider the legislative intent behind this provision.
CA/HCC/0117-118/2023 (02.07.2026)
Murder
Although trial records indicated that indictments were served and jury rights explained to both on 01.03.2016, the High Court record revealed the indictment was never actually read/served to the 2nd Appellant, nor was he offered the option of a jury trial.
Failing to read/explain the charge and failing to inform the accused of their right to elect a jury trial are fatal procedural illegalities (not mere irregularities) that violate fundamental rights to a fair trial and render the conviction void.
CA/HCC/0078/2020 (09.07.2026)
The Accused Appellant and the 1st Accused were indicted under Section 54A of the Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance for the joint possession and trafficking of 5.496 kg of Heroin on 08.06.2012 at Weligampitiya.
The Court held that mere presence in the company of a person carrying drugs, without evidence of knowledge, control, or dominion over the contraband, is insufficient to prove joint or constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt.
August
HCC 317/25 (03.08.2016)
The Appellant and three others were jointly indicted in the High Court of Anuradhapura on two counts of being in possession of an automatic gun, an offence under the Firearms Ordinance and being in possession of 9 live bullets in the same transaction, an offence under the Explosives Act.
The Court of Appeal found that the sole witness, PW1, provided contradictory testimony (initially claiming he saw the van skid, but later admitting under cross-examination that he only saw it after it had already toppled). These per se contradictions and the lack of corroborating evidence created reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution’s narrative.
The prosecution failed to establish a clear chain of custody for the weapon from the crime scene to the Government Analyst and the courtroom, leaving critical gaps that undermined the evidentiary value of the production item.
HCC 227 – 230 / 2025 (07.08.2026)
It is also significant to note that the prosecutrix’s house was not connected to an electricity supply and that the occupants had relied upon kerosene lamps for illumination for a considerable period prior to the incident. Therefore, the prosecutrix would have been accustomed to identifying persons and performing daily activities under limited lighting conditions. This circumstance is relevant in assessing the reliability of her identification, as she was not unfamiliar with poor lighting conditions in the manner a person accustomed to an urban environment may be.
CA/HCC/0248/2025 (31.08.2026)
The Accused-Appellant was intercepted by the Police Narcotics Bureau (PNB) at the Bandaranaike International Airport in Katunayake. Acting on a WhatsApp tip-off containing a photograph and passport details, police searched his rolling trolley bag and allegedly found 12 parcels wrapped in carbon paper containing 1 kg 296 g of Diacetylmorphine (Heroin).
The primary identification of the Accused relied on a WhatsApp photograph that was never produced in court because the police officer’s phone application was allegedly deactivated weeks prior. The court held that failing to produce this vital evidence violated the spirit of the best evidence rule and severely weakened the prosecution’s case regarding the identity of the Accused.
The seized parcels weighed approximately 2.039.34 kg upon detection, but measured 2.021.9 kg upon receipt by the Government Analyst, reflecting an unexplained shortage of 17.44 grams. A pair of socks listed in the property receipt (PR 218/18) did not appear in the Government Analyst’s intake records, yet mysteriously appeared during courtroom
Further, key police witnesses (such as PW1 and PW3) gave conflicting accounts regarding whether the luggage was subjected to a secondary scanner test after the arrest, the logging of contemporaneous notes, and the timeline of preparing the “B” report and recording official statements.
Moreover, the trial judge had improperly evaluated the defense’s dock statement against the prosecution’s evidence, effectively shifting the burden of proof and reversing the fundamental presumption of innocence.
CA/CPA/77/2023 (along with connected cases CA/CPA/0118/2023, CA/CPA/0119/2023, CA/CPA/0130/2023, CA/CPA/0131/2023, CA/CPA/0154/2023, and CA/CPA/0007/2024)
Decided Date: 04.08.2026
Bribery Act
05 Bench Judgment
The respondents raised a preliminary objection arguing that the investigation was void ab initio because it was conducted without a directive issued by the full complement of all three members of the Commission. On 19.05.2023, the High Court judge upheld this objection and discharged the respondents.
The Court of Appeal found that neither the Bribery Act nor the CIABOC Act mandates that all three commissioners must jointly issue a direction to commence an investigation or institute proceedings.
Referring to Supreme Court precedent (Indikatiya Hewage Kusumadasa Mahanama v. CIABOC), the court affirmed that trial judges are bound to accept indictments if sections 12(1) and 12(2) of the CIABOC Act are met. Any challenge regarding the validity of the Commission’s directive under Section 11 must be brought before the Supreme Court via a Writ application, as restricted by Section 24 of the CIABOC Act.
PHC 134-23 (07.08.2026)
Confiscation of a vehicle under mines and mineral Act
September
CA/HCC/0005/2025 (01.09.2026)
The indictment was served on 20th February 2020, but the charge was never read to the appellant until the end of the trial. On June 13, 2024 (when calling the case to deliver judgment), the judge recalled PW1 and PW2 without cross-examination, and allowed an amendment to the indictment to include the appellant’s alias names. Only then was the amended indictment read and a plea taken, but the mandatory jury option was still not provided to the appellant
The failure to read the initial charge throughout the trial and the improper reading of the amended indictment without a jury option undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial process.
CA/HCC/0135/2025 (03.09.2026)
rape against a physically disabled (deaf and dumb) woman
The prosecutrix testified that while alone at home, the Appellant grabbed her and engaged in sexual intercourse on a nearby rock.
The prosecutrix did not report the incident immediately out of fear. She only disclosed it approximately one month later to her sister after realizing her menstruation had stopped.
Upon learning of the pregnancy/cessation of menstruation, the prosecutrix’s sister joked that she might need to marry, to which the prosecutrix agreed, indicating the Appellant had persuaded her with a promise of marriage. Her father also assaulted her for having gone with the Appellant. A formal police complaint was filed on May 28, 2009.
The Court observed that the prosecutrix disclosed the incident only after her menstruation ceased, fearing pregnancy.
The testimony of her sister revealed that the prosecutrix had been persuaded by a promise of marriage rather than subjected to physical force or non-consensual rape.
The father’s reaction further suggested that her actions were perceived as consensual. These surrounding circumstances created reasonable doubt as to whether the act occurred without her consent.
Ruling that the absence of formal sign language training does not render a deaf and dumb witness’s evidence inadmissible or unreliable. The Court Interpreter confirmed that she was fully capable of understanding and communicating effectively.
The prosecutrix was unable to identify the perpetrator among several men brought before her and only identified the Appellant after being shown a photograph.
The Court found this identification process to be suggestive, biased, and unreliable, noting that the trial judge failed to evaluate it with requisite judicial caution
The prosecutrix claimed she sustained back injuries on the rock and showed them to her mother. However, her mother made no mention of such injuries, and the Judicial Medical Officer (JMO) found no external injuries on her body.
While the absence of injuries alone does not disprove rape, the direct contradiction between her testimony and the medical findings cast significant doubt on her account.
HCC 0222/2024 (04.09.2026)
Under Section 165(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act No. 15 of 1979, the purpose of specifying a timeframe is to provide sufficient notice and show the offense is not time-barred. Since the appellant did not present an alibi, the victim’s general timeframe (prior to her statement on November 16, 2011) was legally sufficient.
CA/HCC/0099/2024 (07.09.2026)
Evidence was that the Appellant had embraced her twice and kissed her. The High Court convicted the Appellant of grave sexual abuse.
The Court of Appeal held citing judicial precedents (e.g., Mahalakotuwa v. AG), that Section 365B requires an act of a very serious/grave nature for sexual gratification that falls short of rape—a mere “touch,” embrace, or kiss does not meet the legal threshold for grave sexual abuse”
Accordingly, the conviction was delegated to that of Sexual Harassment.
CA/HCC/0023-24/2024 (17.09.2026)
Kidnaping and Statutory Rape
During the appeal, the Court permitted additional expert evidence under Section 329 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act regarding DNA report ‘X’ from GeneTech
The DNA analysis showed no detectable DNA belonging to the 1st Appellant in the victim’s vaginal smears, despite the victim being examined by the JMO within 48 hours and alleging ejaculation. Female DNA was detected, ruling out total sample degradation
The Court of Appeal held that the High Court judgment lacked proper analysis, reasoning, and evaluation of evidentiary material.
The Court held that since Count 3 (rape) was intrinsically tied to the kidnapping alleged in Count 2, acquitting the 1st Appellant of Count 2 meant Count 3 could not logically be sustained
Inconsistencies between the victim’s testimony in court and her initial statement to the JMO touched upon principal events/facts, rendering her evidence unsafe to sustain a conviction
The negative DNA results raised a strong reasonable doubt regarding the identity of the perpetrator. Because the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, this doubt must inure to the benefit of the accused
CA/HCC/0213/24 (17.09.2026)
During the investigation by the National Child Protection Authority (NCPA), officers recorded a video statement from the victim (PW1) in the presence of an OIC, a woman police constable, and a psychologist.
The prosecution failed to disclose or provide a copy of this video-recorded statement of PW1 to the defense or the court during the trial. The defense argued this non-disclosure deprived the Appellant of a fair trial.
The Court held that withholding prior statements/materials generated during an investigation from the defense violates the right to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 13(3) of the Constitution
Citing precedent (Wijepala v. Attorney General and R v. Stinchcombe), the Court reiterated that information in a police file belongs to the public to ensure justice is done, not merely to secure convictions. The prosecution has a professional and constitutional duty to disclose all information—whether relied upon or not—that could assist the defense or impeach the credibility of key witnesses.
Because evidence indicated prior animosity between the Appellant and PW1’s father (raising the possibility of coaching or collateral motives), denying access to PW1’s video recording deprived the defense of the opportunity to cross-examine her on inconsistencies, credibility, or coaching
CA HCC 336/2025 (17.09.2026)
On November 11, 2011, the trial judge inquired with the appellant pursuant to Section 195(ee) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act No. 15 of 1979 whether he wished to be tried by a jury, and the appellant expressly elected to be tried before a jury.
On July 1, 2014, defense counsel informed the court that the appellant was amenable to being tried by the High Court Judge without a jury, despite the appellant’s previous personal election. The trial subsequently commenced before the judge alone on February 21, 2017.
The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence to the Court of Appeal, raising a preliminary objection that proceeding with a trial by a judge alone based on counsel’s representation violated Section 195(ee) and deprived him of his right to a fair trial under Article 13(3) of the Constitution
The Court held that inquiring from an accused whether he elects to be tried by a jury is a mandatory duty imposed on the trial judge under Section 195(ee). It is a personal right vested in the accused directly and cannot be delegated or waived through statements made by counsel over the head of the accused.
Non-observance of this requirement constitutes an illegality rather than a mere irregularity. The trial judge misdirected himself by proceeding without a jury based solely on the defense counsel’s application when the appellant had previously elected a jury trial
The Court rejected the State’s argument that the failure did not occasion a miscarriage of justice or that it was cured by the appellant not raising the objection during trial, emphasizing that the election of trial by peers is a fundamental safeguard of the right to a fair trial under Article 13(3) of the Constitution
CA/HCC/0039/2025 (21.09.2026)
8.88 grams of drugs
Material Inconsistencies in Prosecution Evidence:
- PW1 stated that the meeting location (‘Stadium Park’) was situated behind the Sugathadasa Stadium, whereas PW4 testified that the raid took place in the Keththarama area.
- PW1 recorded the arrest at 17:40 hours, while PW4 testified that the Appellant was apprehended at 14:40 hours.
- PW1 claimed he made an out-entry at 15:15 hours and left the bureau at 15:30 hours, whereas PW4 stated he only reported for the raid duty at 15:50 hours.
- PW1 testified to waiting around half an hour before the arrest, while PW4 stated they waited for approximately an hour
CA(PHC) 0018/21 (25.09.2026)
The Government Agent/District Secretary of Anuradhapura (as the Competent Authority) filed an ejectment application in the Magistrate’s Court (MC) of Anuradhapura under Section 6 of the Government Quarters (Recovery of Possession) Act No. 07 of 1969 (as amended) to recover a government quarter occupied by the Appellant
CA/CPA/0039/26 (25.09.2026)
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Act No. 10 of 2001
The Secretary to the Ministry of Justice (acting as the Central Authority under the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Act No. 10 of 2001) filed an application on October 3, 2025, in the High Court of Colombo concerning the minor child Kiara Maria Dissanayake, seeking an order for the return of the child to Canada and travel restrictions against the 2nd Respondent-Petitioner
The 2nd Respondent-Petitioner raised a preliminary objection arguing that the supporting affidavit dated October 2, 2025, was defective because it was attested by a Commissioner for Oaths who was an employee of the Central Authority, violating the prohibition under the Oaths Ordinance.
On April 28, 2026, the High Court judge directed the Petitioner-Respondent to furnish a duly attested fresh affidavit within two weeks, implicitly treating the original affidavit as faulty but curable.
The 2nd Respondent-Petitioner filed a revision application in the Court of Appeal to set aside the High Court’s order, arguing that a defective supporting affidavit is incurable, renders the application a nullity, and warrants an in-limine dismissal.
Reviewing Section 376 of the Civil Procedure Code and relevant jurisprudence, the Court held that while a summary procedure petition must be supported by prima facie evidence, a defective affidavit does not trigger an automatic dismissal of the action because such defects are curable in law.
CA/HCC/0090/2025 (25.09.2026)
The court held that joining statutory rape and grave sexual abuse in a single indictment does not constitute an improper misjoinder if the offences arise out of the same transaction or are of the same class of offences against the body. Furthermore, amending charges is permissible under Section 167 of the Criminal Procedure Code before judgment is pronounced, provided the alteration is read to the accused and fair trial safeguards (such as recalling witnesses) are respected.
CA/HCC 162/2025 (30.09.2026)
In an Appeal concerning Grave Sexual Abuse, the Court found a significant discrepancy between PW01’s trial testimony—where he alleged both intercrural sex and anal penetration—and the medical history recorded by the medico-legal officer, which made no mention of anal penetration.
Appeal No. 165/2023 (15.09.2026)
The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeals without costs, answering that judicial officers are liable to income tax and that the respondents are legally entitled to make APIT deductions
SC Appeal No. 23/2016 (15.09.2026)
While the Court of Appeal incorrectly categorized the entire case as resting purely on circumstantial evidence (since PW-01 did not see the actual striking of his father), the Supreme Court clarified that the case relied primarily on direct eyewitness testimony for Count 2 and circumstantial evidence via the “last seen” theory for Count 1. Because the time gap was negligible and the accused was the sole person with the deceased at the time of the attack, the inference of guilt was inescapable
Relevance of the Allocutus: The Supreme Court highlighted that although an allocutus has no formal place during a trial, an accused person’s statement made during the allocutus can be considered on appeal. Here, the accused’s allocutus statement claiming self-defense served as an unequivocal admission confirming his presence and involvement, directly contradicting his earlier trial stance of a total denial
SC.F.R. Application No. 275/2024 (29.09.2026)
On November 3, 2010, a brand-new Toyota Land Cruiser Jeep (bearing registration No. WP-KI-4666 and valued at Rs. 19,500,000) was handed over to the Disaster Management Centre (DMC) under a project funded by foreign aid to enhance Sri Lanka’s Emergency Response Network.
On November 14, 2010, the 1st Respondent (Abdul Hameed Muhammed Fawzi), who was then the Minister of Disaster Management, induced the Ministry Secretary via telephone to deliver the specialized disaster command vehicle to his residence within an hour.
In late 2010, the 1st Respondent ceased to be the Minister of Disaster Management and became the Senior Minister of Urban Affairs, yet he refused to return the vehicle and continued to use it for personal benefits despite repeated reminders.
Between April 2011 and June 2014, the 1st Respondent caused public funds amounting to Rs. 1,073,334.93 from the Office of Senior Ministers to be expended on maintaining the vehicle
The vehicle was returned to the DMC on January 20, 2015, requiring estimated repairs of Rs. 540,000 due to unauthorized use. Upon being reappointed as Minister of Disaster Management in March 2015, he requested and took possession of the vehicle again until it was returned on September 17, 2015, incurring further repair costs of Rs. 51,100.
On November 2, 2022, the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) indicted the 1st Respondent in Colombo High Court Case No. HCB 195/2022. On August 27, 2024, the 1st Respondent pleaded guilty to all four charges and was sentenced to a suspended prison term along with fines totaling Rs. 400,000.
The Petitioner (Chandra Jayaratne) filed this application on September 25, 2024, within a month of learning about the conviction through media reports
The Supreme Court held that the 1st Respondent’s actions constituted a grave betrayal of public trust and infringed upon the fundamental right to equality before the law and equal protection of the law guaranteed under Article 12(1) of the Constitution.
The Court ruled that because the 1st Respondent entered an unconditional plea of guilt in the criminal proceedings, he admitted to acts of bribery and corruption and was legally estopped from contesting those facts in the fundamental rights inquiry.
The Court dismissed the 1st Respondent’s preliminary objections, holding that the availability of a civil action for public misfeasance or criminal liability does not preclude or oust the exclusive constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to examine executive abuses under fundamental rights.
Emphasizing the public trust doctrine, the Court underscored that public resources—especially those funded by taxpayers or foreign loans—are held in trust for the people and cannot be exploited for personal or political gain.
The 1st Respondent was directed to pay Rs. 1,664,334.93 to the Consolidated Fund within one month (covering vehicle maintenance of Rs. 1,073,334.93 and repair costs of Rs. 540,000 and Rs. 51,100).
Due to zero-tolerance policies toward corruption among high-ranking public officials, the 1st Respondent was ordered to pay a further sum of Rs. 5 million as exemplary compensation to the Consolidated Fund within two months.
The 1st Respondent was ordered to publish a half-page public apology notice featuring a picture of the misused vehicle in all three languages on the front page of the Sunday Observer, Silumina, and Tinakaran Varamanjari within one month.
CA/WRT/07/2025 (30.09.2026)
The Petitioner approached the Court of Appeal under Article 140 of the Constitution seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent the 1st to 4th Respondents from arresting or taking into custody its directors (including Mr. Tiran Alles) and employees in connection with the cheques
The Court found that the transaction was strictly a commercial civil dispute arising from the supply of newsprint and an ongoing business relationship, rather than a criminal transaction
The prosecution sought to apply sections of the Penal Code relating to criminal misappropriation, criminal breach of trust, and cheating (Sections 386, 389, 400, and 403). The Court held that the prosecution must prove a mental element of dishonesty or fraudulence from the inception. The mere subsequent dishonor of cheques does not establish a dishonest intention at the time of their issuance
The Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence or material to incriminate the Petitioner, its directors, or employees in the alleged criminal offenses. Accordingly, the Court issued a writ of prohibition restraining the 1st to 4th Respondents from arresting or taking into custody Mr. Tiran Alles, directors, officers, and employees of the Petitioner in connection with the cheques listed in Schedule “A”. However, the judgment noted that this order does not prevent authorities from investigating further if new material regarding the transaction is discovered.
S.C.F.R. Application Nos. 256/2019 and 257/2019 (10.09.2026)
The Supreme Court declared that the presidential pardon granted to the Rev. Galagodaaththe Gnanasara Thero is null and void, in violation of public trust and Article 12(1) of the Constitution, though noting this does not legally bar a future pardon if done strictly in accordance with the law.
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