Judgments to Remember

Essential takeaways from recent court decisions

Explore concise breakdowns of landmark judicial pronouncements, rulings, and evolving legal interpretations that are shaping modern jurisprudence

2025

January

 CA/BAL/0603/2023 (29.01.2025)

When a suspect is held in remand it is the duty of the investigative authorities to expedite the process and conclude the investigation without undue delay. If there is a delay a plausible and a reasonable explanation should be forthcoming. Probably, this suspect may even be the intended courier or the intended recipient of the contraband. However, unless there is tangible evidence to establish this position, it will be no more than a mere surmise or suspicion

 CA/BAL/0401/2023 (17.01.2025)

Aiding and abetting another to possess and traffic drugs

“It is not the lapse of time that is relevant and critical in this matter. It is the probable defence of the lack of knowledge and conscious joint possession qua driver of a hiring vehicle. Suspect claims to be hiring his vehicle for a fee and the defence is that the other person was merely a passenger who was travelling for a fee. This defence considered in conjunction with the fact that nothing was found in his possession appears to be a presentable defence that may have the propensity of creating a doubt as to conscious possession. This considered with the delay which remains not fully explained create the circumstances which can be considered as being exceptional and the suspect is thus entitled to be enlarged on bail”

CA-TRF/21/24 (28.01.2025)

Transfer Application from one Magistrate Court to another on the basis of bias

CA Case No: PHC/10/2018 (30.01.2025)

Further, in the case of Gamaralalage Jayasinghe and Others V. Mahara Mudiyanselage Loku Bandara, [2019] 2 Sri LR 202, Samayawardhena J. held that;

“Then, under section 66(2), it has been enacted that when the first information is filed under section 66(1), irrespective of whether it is filed by the police or a party to the dispute, the Magistrate is automatically vested with jurisdiction to inquire into and determine the matter, without further ado…….

Under section 66(1), the formation of opinion as to whether a breach of the peace is threatened or likely is left to the police officer inquiring into the dispute or to any party to the dispute. Both are on equal footing. Who files the information is beside the point.”

“Therefore, it is clear that the learned Magistrate has the authority to inquire into the matter when an application is made under section 66 of the Primary Courts Procedure Act, irrespective of whether it is filed by a police officer or a private party. Furthermore, the above judgment overrules the judgment by his Lordship Ismail J. in Velupillai V. Sivanathan [1993]1 SLR 123, and holds that it does not correctly represent the law in this regard. The question of breach of the peace is threatened or likely‟ is dependent on the police officer who inquires about the matter or the party to the dispute who files the application”

February

CA/CPA/0116/2024 (25.02.2025)

Convicted by MC in abesentia on 27.08.2010. Appealed after 06 years, rejected in 2017.

Appellant argued that, Section 4(2) of the ICCPR Act No. 56 of 2007, which allows a convicted person to appeal without a specified time limit.

Held – The ICCPR Act does not override time limit in S. 320 of CCPA

CPA 0003/2025 (17.02.2025)

The prosecution sought to play a video recording of an interview with the child victim, recorded by two police officers under Section 163A of the Evidence (Special Provisions) Act No. 32 of 1999. The defense objected, arguing that Statements in a criminal case must be in writing under Section 110(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CPC), only non-police officers should conduct such interviews for them to be admissible under Section 163A and the video should not be played in court with the child witness present.

It was held that Video evidence is admissible under Section 163A, even if recorded by police officers.The Evidence (Special Provisions) Act was enacted separately to allow video-recorded evidence in child abuse cases.The correct legal procedure was followed, and the High Court’s ruling was not illegal or improper.

Rule No. 05/2023 (20.02.2025.)

Rule was issued for failure to register a deed (Deed No. 128) for Lot 7B, despite receiving Rs. 500,000 and Rs. 30,000 for legal services,  illegally granting a right of way over Lot 7B in Deed No. 126 without the complainant’s approvalBottom of Form and executing Deed No. 126 even though one of the transferors was dead at the time.

March

CA/HCC/0093/2020 (07.03.2025)

Voluntary intoxication as a defence – upheld

CA/PHC/134/2024 (27.03.2025)
CA/PHC/APN 151/2024 (28.03.2025)
CA/CPA/08/2025 (28.03.2025)

No revision lies to Court of Appeal from an Order of Provincial High Court in the exerciseof its Revisionary jurisdiction. Because both Courts (CA and HC) enjoy concurrent jurisdiction of Revision.

Therefore, only an Appeal lies to Court of Appeal from an Order of Provincial High Court in the exerciseof its Revisionary jurisdiction.

CPA 152/24 (20.03.2025)

To Offensive Weapon Act, the Bail Act Applies

CA/HCC/0081/2021 (27.03.2025)

An Appellate Court exercises a jurisdiction to examine the effect of the grounds raised in appeal. However, the Appellate Court will not step into shoes of the trier of fact and revisit the evidence afresh and substitute its own findings. The defects or insufficiency in the evidence and errors of law and procedure are required to be tested and considered in the context of the totality of the evidence and trial.

On an appeal from a conviction by a Judge alone, where the issue is whether the verdict is unreasonable, an Appellate Court must determine whether the verdict is one that a properly instructed jury or judge could reasonably have reached. The question whether a verdict is reasonable is one of law but the evaluation of evidence is one of fact. The Appeal Court cannot interfere with those assessments of fact unless it cannot be supported on any reasonable view of the evidence. [vide R. v. Burke, 1996 CanLII 229 (SCC)].

CA/HCC/445/19 (06.03.2025

Conviction was overturned on the grounds that (i) the inward journey had not been proved  (ii) the Padlock of the Cupboard from which the narcotic found had not been produced (iii) Hearsay evidence (The wife of the Accused had said that, the cupboard was being exclusively used by the Accused. But the wife was not called as a witness)

CA HCC 195/2019 (28.03.2025)

In the instant case, PW1 and PW5 in their evidence have stated that the informant was with them at a location by the side of a road in which the appellant was expected to travel on. In fact, it is their testimony that the informant was with them when the three-wheel scooter which the appellant drove went past them. Such an incident discloses a situation where the law enforcement officers have not taken action to protect the identity of an informant, which is not normal and is unusual.

CA/HCC/0169/2020 (12.03.2025)

Last seen theory and S. 27 statement. Last Seen theory – 15 hour time gap with not exact time of death fixed

“The fact that the accused was last seen with the victim or at the crime scene does not automatically imply that the accused is guilty of committing the crime. There must be additional evidence that establishes a clear connection between the accused and the crime itself”

27 Statement – elements set out. Its legal implication (only knowledge) affirmed.

SC/FRA/59/2025 (04.04.2025)
Petition against the rejection of nominations for Local Government Election.

Nomination had been rejected due to, inter alia, missing or improperly attested affidavits (SC/FR/59/25, SC/FR/60/25).

The Supreme Court held that Affidavits must be properly filled and attested. Mere signatures without names or blank forms are invalid and oaths must follow Seventh Schedule to the Constitution—a solemn oral declaration is mandatory.

 RTI/04/2022 (06.03.2025)

The 1st Respondent, a member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka (ICASL), sought information under the Right to Information Act, No. 12 of 2016, concerning an alleged fraud of Rs. 20.7 million, including the names of the Ethics Committee members who dealt with the complaint and whether due inquiry procedures had been followed. ICASL refused to disclose certain information, relying on the exemption relating to personal information under Section 5(1)(a). On appeal, the RTI Commission, by its decision dated 09.02.2022, directed ICASL to disclose the information.

ICASL challenged this decision in the Court of Appeal, arguing (i) the RTI Commission delayed its decision (beyond the 30-day limit under Section 32) (ii) the requested information was already known to the 1st Respondent (a complainant) (iii) the disclosure would violate privacy rights of Ethics Committee members.

The Court of Appeal held that the 30-day period prescribed under Section 32 for the RTI Commission to make its decision is directory and not mandatory, and that a delay would not invalidate the decision. The Court further held that the information sought was properly disclosable, including the names of the Ethics Committee members, as transparency of bodies exercising adjudicatory functions is essential for accountability and no specific prejudice from disclosure had been established. The Court also noted that ICASL had itself failed to comply with statutory time limits and had therefore not approached the Court with clean hands.

SC/FR/37/2020 (18.03.2025)

The Petitioner was arrested on 30th January 2020 for possession of heroin and firearms and was initially detained pursuant to a 7-day order made by the Magistrate’s Court under the Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance. On 6th February 2020, a 90-day detention order was issued under the Prevention of Terrorism Act by the then President, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, purportedly in his capacity as Minister of Defence. The Petitioner challenged the validity of the detention order on the basis that, under the 19th Amendment to the Constitution then in force, the President lacked authority to act as Minister of Defence unless he was a Member of Parliament.

The Court held that the 19th Amendment did not permit the President to exercise the functions of the Minister of Defence in the absence of the constitutional qualification of being a Member of Parliament. Accordingly, the President lacked the legal authority to issue the detention order in question, and the order, being made ultra vires, was invalid.

Wrt 168/25 (17.03.2025)

The Petitioner, the Inspector General of Police (IGP), sought writs of Certiorari and Prohibition to quash a Magistrate’s order directing his arrest in connection with a police operation in Weligama in December 2023. The order alleged that the IGP had authorized an unlawful paramilitary operation involving unauthorized weapons and vehicles in breach of police protocols. The Petitioner challenged the order on the grounds that the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to issue an arrest warrant without summons under Section 136(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code, that the investigation was biased, and that no statement had been obtained from him before the order was made.

The Court dismissed the application, holding that the Petitioner had failed to disclose material documents, including inquest reports and B-reports, which supported the Magistrate’s order. The Court found that the Magistrate had acted within the authority conferred by Sections 136 and 139 of the Criminal Procedure Code and had relied on evidence concerning the incident, including the use of illegal weapons and the absence of proper police records. The Court further noted that an appeal to the High Court was an available alternative remedy and emphasized that the IGP, as head of the police, was required to comply with court orders. His evasion of arrest and alleged misconduct disentitled him to equitable relief under the clean hands doctrine.

CA/BAL/0002/2024 (11.03.2025)
CA/BAL/0344/2024 (11.03.2025)

Both cases, no prima facie cases. Bail granted

 CA/BAL/0621/2023 (18.03.2025)

The Petitioner, Mohamed Rameez Mohamed Sajid, the 9th accused in High Court Case No. HC TAB 2972/2021, sought bail under Section 15B of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), as amended in 2022. He faced 931 charges in an indictment containing 23,270 counts against 25 accused and had remained in remand since 21.04.2019. Although the trial had commenced, its progress was prolonged by the large number of charges and witnesses. The Petitioner contended that his continued detention for several years unjustly deprived him of his youth, while the State opposed bail on grounds including the complexity and progress of the trial, the risk of absconding, the gravity of the charges, and the available evidence.

The Court held that Section 15B, by virtue of its non-obstante clause, empowers the Court to consider bail where the trial had not commenced within 12 months of arrest, notwithstanding the subsequent commencement of the trial. The Court recognized the Petitioner’s lengthy remand but also considered the lawful joinder of charges and accused, the complexity of the proceedings, the previous refusal of bail by the High Court, and the potential for further delay if bail were granted. It further held that bail under Section 15B requires a case-specific assessment of the circumstances and does not impose a mandatory requirement of establishing “exceptional circumstances.”

CA (CPA) 162/2022 (03.03.2025)

The case concerned a revision application against the Colombo Provincial High Court order dated 08.12.2022 directing the return of two children to Italy under the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Act, No. 10 of 2001, giving effect to the 1980 Hague Convention. The children, born and having lived in Italy for several years, had been brought to Sri Lanka by their mother on a temporary visit but were not returned in breach of an Italian court order. The mother resisted the return on grounds including wrongful retention, the alleged risk of psychological harm, the father’s past conduct and possible foster care, and a Sri Lankan custody order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s order and dismissed the revision application. It held that the children’s habitual residence remained Italy, applying the test of integration into their social and family environment, and that their retention in Sri Lanka constituted wrongful retention under Section 3 of the Act. The Court further held that the alleged psychological harm was not established by sufficient and reliable evidence, that concerns regarding the father and foster care were speculative, and that a Sri Lankan custody order could not override the return mechanism under the Hague Convention and the Act. Accordingly, no exception under Section 11 was established to prevent the children’s return to Italy.

April

CA/WRT/0085/2025 (04.04.2025)

The case against Colombo Lotus Tower Management Company (Pvt) Ltd

The Petitioner sought writs of Certiorari, Mandamus, and Prohibition under Article 140 of the Constitution, challenging the 1st Respondent’s actions including, Eviction from commercial premises at the Colombo Lotus Tower, Charging full lease rent despite inadequate utility services, Failure to enter into a lease agreement, Unlawful interference with possession, and Violating legitimate expectations based on a letter of award and subsequent correspondence.

The Respondents raised Objections – The matter is purely contractual, The Petitioner should have sought specific performance, Alternatively, the Petitioner could have claimed damages, There is no violation of natural justice.

Court’s Findings:

    • The agreement between the parties (based on a letter of award and an email) was contractual, not administrative or statutory.
    • The 1st Respondent, despite being a state-owned company, acted within a private commercial capacity, not exercising public or statutory power.
    • Judicial review under Article 140 is not applicable to matters arising solely from contracts lacking statutory flavor.
    • The proper remedies for the Petitioner lie in civil actions for specific performance, damages, or injunctive relief, not through writ jurisdiction.
    • The Court found the Petitioner failed to fulfill its contractual obligations (e.g., lease payments), undermining any legitimate expectation claim.

SC No. 88/2021 (30.04.2025)

The Appellant, Nadugala Vidhana Pathiranage Piyadasa Rathuralagewatte, was convicted on four counts under the Motor Traffic Act and fined by the Magistrate of Nugegoda, also ordered to pay Rs. 20,000 in compensation. He sought revision from the High Court and subsequent appeals to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.

Core Legal Issue: Whether Rule 3(1)(b) of the Court of Appeal (Appellate Procedure) Rules 1990 requires certified copies of relevant proceedings, similar to Rule 3(1)(a).

Supreme Court Decision:

    • The Court held that both Rule 3(1)(a) and 3(1)(b) must be read together, and certified copies are mandatory

SC Appeal 203/2012 (04.04.2025)

The Urban Council of Panadura issued a closing order under Section 77 of the Housing and Town Improvement Ordinance, declaring a building with several dwellings unfit for human habitation based on reports from the MOH and Council Engineer. The Magistrate’s Court issued the order without giving notice to tenants. Some occupants (appellants) challenged this, claiming the order was made without due process and in collusion with the owner.

Held –

    • The Court found that Section 77 does not require notice to tenants, only to the owner.
    • Found no legal basis to involve tenants before making a closing order.
    • Held that the Magistrate acted properly in restoring the initial order due to a clear mistake by the Additional Magistrate.

SC FR 203/2024 (04.04.2025)

The case involves a Fundamental Rights application filed by M.A. Sumanthiran under Article 126 of the Sri Lankan Constitution, alleging violations of fundamental rights under Article 12(1). The petitioner sought interim relief, and the Supreme Court issued an order on 13.09.2024 directing the respondents (including the 1st Respondent, I.S.H.J. Illukpitiya, the Controller General of Immigration and Emigration) to maintain the status quo ante as of 16.04.2024.The 1st Respondent failed to comply with this interim order, leading to contempt of court proceedings under the Contempt of Court, Tribunal or Institution Act, No. 8 of 2024.

Contempt of Court Proceedings:

    • The Court found prima facie evidence of contempt and issued a rule against the 1st Respondent on 25.09.2024, detaining him until the conclusion of the inquiry.
    • The 1st Respondent filed a bail application on 01.11.2024, citing personal hardships (family responsibilities, financial difficulties, and health issues) as grounds for release.

Court’s Decision on Bail:

    • The Court rejected the bail application, stating that the grounds raised (family responsibilities, financial strain, and health conditions) were common to many accused persons and not exceptional.
    • The Court noted that the 1st Respondent had access to medical treatment in prison and that his wife’s health issues were irrelevant to his bail request.
    • The Court emphasized the seriousness of the contempt charge and the risk of witness tampering, given the 1st Respondent’s position as Controller General of Immigration

May

CA/HCC /0287/2014 (15.05.2025)

The trial judge had merely narrated the evidence of prosecution witnesses and failed to analyze or discuss the legal and factual issues raised during the trial.

failure to give reasons renders a judgment a nullity

CA/HCC /0287/2014 (15.05.2025)

Unlawful assembly : There was no analysis of (i) Who the members of the alleged unlawful assembly were (ii) Whether they shared a common object; (iii) Whether that object was unlawful in terms of the Penal Code (iv) Whether the Appellants’ actions were in furtherance of that object.

CA/HCC /0287/2014 (15.05.2025)

Common Intention : (i) LTJ Merely used the term “unlawful assembly” and “common object” without elaboration (ii) Did not assess whether the accused were acting together in pursuit of a shared purpose (iii) Failed to relate the facts of each accused to the legal standards required to prove shared criminal intent.

liability under common intention cannot be presumed. The judge must analyze each accused’s individual role, determine their participation in the act, and establish beyond reasonable doubt that they shared a common intention to commit the specific offence.

 CA/HCC/0060/2024 (20.05.2025)

It was highly improbable that someone transporting over 1kg of heroin would openly keep the parcel on his lap at a police roadblock. The prosecution’s version was inconsistent with natural human behavior and practical common sense.

CA-HCC/274/2023 (29.05.2025)

DNA

    • The blood sample used for the DNA match was not taken from the body of the deceased but from the ground.
    • The trial judge wrongly assumed it came from the deceased, raising serious doubts about the reliability of the DNA evidence.

Cause of Death Unclear:

    • The Judicial Medical Officer stated the injuries could be from a fall or accident, not necessarily an attack.
    • The prosecution failed to establish the cause of death conclusively.

CA/HCC/0201/2020 (08.05.2025)

Possession of drugs

    • The key officer, IP Amarajith, who allegedly recovered the heroin, did not testify.
    • There was a 15-minute unexplained gap when the production was not seen by other officers (PW-2 and PW-5).
    • The trial judge assumed the drug was kept in the officer’s pocket, but the alleged parcel was too large to be concealed that way.
    • Uncertainty existed whether the heroin introduced to court was truly what was recovered from the appellant.

SC Appeal No. 22/2020 (28.05.2025 )  
(Hudson Samarasinghe v. Thilaka Wadasinghe Liyanarathnage):

The Respondent (Thilaka) sought maintenance from the Appellant (Hudson), whom she married in 1985.

The Appellant was previously married. He was later charged and convicted for bigamy. However, his conviction was overturned on appeal due to lack of mens rea (he claimed he believed his first wife was dead or missing).

The Appellant objected to the Respondent’s maintenance claim, arguing that their marriage was void due to his existing first marriage.

Key Legal Questions & Findings:

Is the Respondent a “spouse” under the Maintenance Act?

    • Held: Yes. The marriage was registered under the Marriage Registration Ordinance.
    • The Appellant failed to obtain a declaration of nullity from a competent court.
    • Hence, the marriage is valid in law unless a Family Court declares otherwise.
    • Presumption of life of the first wife was rebutted (she was absent for 7 years before remarriage).
    • Therefore, the Respondent legally qualifies as a spouse.

CA first Order – It accepted that the Appellant had raised an “exceptional circumstance”—namely the legal question surrounding the validity of the marriage (i.e., whether a person can marry a second time without dissolving the first marriage).

CA 2nd Order – After full hearing, the Court dismissed the revision application on the ground that the Appellant had failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances justifying intervention.

SC – A ruling allowing a case to proceed past preliminary objections does not bind the court to rule in favour of the Petitioner at the final stage

SC Appeal No. 61/2024 (30.05.2025)
(Director General, CIABOC v. Ravi Karunanayake and Arjun Aloysius)

The 1st Accused, Ravi Karunanayake, a former Minister of Finance, was charged under Section 19(c) of the Bribery Act for allegedly accepting rent amounting to approximately Rs. 11.68 million for an apartment from companies linked to the 2nd Accused, Arjun Joseph Aloysius, and for permitting the 2nd Accused to settle condominium fees and lease rentals on his behalf. The 2nd Accused was charged with aiding and abetting the commission of the offence. At the High Court, a preliminary objection was raised contending, inter alia, that the 1st Accused, being a Cabinet Minister, did not fall within the definition of a “public officer” under Article 170 of the Constitution. The High Court rejected the objection. The 1st Accused thereafter sought leave to appeal in the Court of Appeal, which overruled the preliminary objections and permitted the application to proceed. The matter was subsequently taken before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Court of Appeal. The Court held that the failure to name the Director General of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC), who is responsible for instituting prosecutions under the Bribery Act, as a respondent was a fatal omission, as he was a necessary party to the proceedings. The Court further held that an accused has no right of appeal against an interlocutory order overruling a preliminary objection, as the relevant provisions of the Judicature Act contemplate an appeal by an accused following conviction. Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal against the interim order was misconceived in law. The Supreme Court also observed that permitting such interlocutory appeals could unnecessarily delay criminal proceedings and potentially facilitate the stalling of trials. The Court consequently dismissed the 1st Accused’s application for leave to appeal.

The Supreme Court further ruled that Bribery Act uses the term “public servant”, which includes Ministers by virtue of 1994 amendment. Therefore, the 1st Accused can be charged under the Act.

SC Appeal No. 167/2014 (23.05.2025)

The Petitioner-Appellant, Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB), challenged the entitlement of the 4th and 5th Respondents, former employees who had retired at the age of 60, to receive pensions despite having completed only 186 and 228 months of service respectively. CEB’s duly gazetted pension regulations required 240 months of continuous service, contributions to the Provident Fund, and excluded service beyond the age of 60 from pension calculations. Since the Respondents had joined CEB at the ages of 43 and 41, they could not satisfy the 240-month requirement before retirement. They nevertheless claimed pension rights on the basis that CEB had previously relaxed the requirement for other employees. The Arbitrator granted them pro rata pensions, relying on past exceptions, legitimate expectation, and the need to achieve a just and equitable outcome. The Court of Appeal upheld that decision.

The Supreme Court allowed CEB’s appeal and held that the pension regulations, having been duly gazetted under the CEB Act, had the force of law and could not be disregarded or amended except in accordance with the prescribed legal procedure. CEB had no authority to relax or waive the 240-month requirement. The Court further held that previous unlawful grants of pension could not justify the continuation of similar violations, observing that equal protection of the law does not mean equal violation of the law under Article 12 of the Constitution. The Respondents could not rely on legitimate expectation arising from ultra vires acts, and CEB was not estopped from acting lawfully merely because it had acted unlawfully in the past. Although industrial arbitrators possess broad powers to make just and equitable awards, they cannot direct a party to act contrary to binding statutory regulations.

SC Appeal No. 212/2017  (28.05.2025)

The Appellant, Ampara Multipurpose Co-operative Society Ltd., claimed rights to a 24-perch State land in Ampara which had previously been leased in 1969 to the Gal Oya Valley Multipurpose Co-operative Society Ltd., a society which was subsequently dissolved. The Appellant claimed succession to the rights of the dissolved society and challenged the allocation of the land to the 5th Respondent. Although a permit had initially been issued to the 5th Respondent for 17.6 perches in 1982, the Divisional Secretary subsequently recommended in 2004 that the full 24 perches be allocated to her on practical and planning grounds. The Appellant challenged this decision by way of Writ Application No. CA/Writ/2084/2004, which was dismissed by the Court of Appeal in 2016, giving rise to the present appeal. The dispute was preceded by earlier proceedings in which, with the consent of the parties, the Court of Appeal directed that the parties abide by a fresh determination of the Government Agent of Ampara concerning their respective entitlement to the land.

The Supreme Court dismissed the Appellant’s claim on the basis that the subsequent proceedings were barred by the doctrine of res judicata and estoppel per rem judicatam. The Court held that the earlier Court of Appeal judgment, entered with the consent of the parties, had required them to abide by the final determination of the Government Agent, who, following a fresh inquiry, determined that the 5th Respondent had the better entitlement to the disputed land. The Court found that the essential elements of res judicata—the identity of the parties or their privies, the same subject matter and the same cause of action—were satisfied. It further held that the Appellant had acquired no enforceable right to a permit following the dissolution of the original society and that the subsequent administrative decision to allocate the full 24 perches to the 5th Respondent was not shown to be unlawful, procedurally irregular or tainted by bad faith. The Court emphasized that the doctrine of res judicata serves the fundamental purposes of finality of litigation and prevention of repeated adjudication of the same dispute.

SC Appeal No. 116/2022 Judgment (08.05.2025)
Patli Champika Ranawaka’s Accident matter
Majority Judgment

Fhe case concerned whether a previous conviction entered by a Magistrate’s Court on a plea of guilt could prevent a subsequent court from re-examining an issue that had been involved in the earlier proceedings. The central question was whether the doctrine of issue estoppel—which prevents the re-litigation of a specific factual or legal issue necessarily determined in earlier proceedings—could operate in criminal proceedings in Sri Lanka. The distinction between a conviction following a plea of guilt and a conviction following a judicial determination based on evidence was particularly relevant, as the earlier Magistrate’s Court proceedings had not involved an independent determination of the facts through evidence.

By majority, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of issue estoppel is not recognized as applicable to criminal proceedings in Sri Lanka, distinguishing it from the principle expressed in res judicata pro veritate accipitur, applied in earlier decisions such as Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor and The Queen v. Ariyawantha. The Court emphasized that a conviction based on a plea of guilt is a procedural shortcut founded upon the accused’s admission and is not equivalent to a judicial determination of guilt based on evidence; accordingly, such a conviction could not prevent the High Court from subsequently examining the identity of the driver. The majority further observed that the Evidence Ordinance, which codifies the relevant rules of evidence, does not recognize issue estoppel in criminal proceedings. Justice Murdu N.B. Fernando agreed with the ultimate result but differed on the doctrine, expressing the view that issue estoppel could potentially have limited application in appropriate circumstances, including cases involving fraud.

 The Court further ruled that the Attorney-General was not required to set aside the Magistrate’s Court conviction before proceeding with the High Court indictment. The charges in the High Court (conspiracy, fabrication of evidence) were distinct from those in the Magistrate’s Court (negligent driving). The High Court could adjudicate the new charges independently.

The Court noted that if the Magistrate’s Court conviction was obtained through fraud (as alleged by the prosecution), it would not bar the High Court proceedings. Fraud vitiates judicial findings, and public policy supports prosecuting such cases to uphold justice.

SC FR Application No. 33/2021 (22.05.2025)
Case of Dilrukshi Dias Wickramasinghe against the recommendations made against her by a Presidential Commission of Inquiry (COI)

This case concerned a Commission of Inquiry appointed by the then President to investigate alleged incidents of political victimization of public officers, employees of State corporations, members of the armed forces and police personnel during the period 2015–2019. The Petitioner challenged the Commission’s proceedings on the basis that it had exceeded the limits of its mandate by entertaining complaints from persons who did not fall within those four categories. Inquiry No. 1 concerned a complaint by the 32nd Respondent, a retired army officer and chairman of a private company; Inquiry No. 3 concerned the 34th Respondent, a private individual who was not a public officer; and Inquiry No. 4 concerned the 35th Respondent, a private businessman who was likewise outside the Commission’s terms of reference. The Petitioner further alleged violations of natural justice, contending that she was not properly notified of the inquiries or afforded a fair opportunity to defend herself. In Inquiry No. 2, she was summoned at short notice and denied access to relevant documents, while in Inquiry No. 4 the Commission concluded its proceedings without serving summons on her. It was also alleged that the Commission failed to comply with Sections 16 and 23 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, including the requirements relating to representation by legal counsel and compliance with the principles of natural justice before making adverse findings. Subsequently, a Special Presidential Commission was appointed to review the findings of the first Commission, but it lapsed without submitting a report. The Public Service Commission, CIABOC and the Attorney General’s Department confirmed that they had not acted upon the recommendations of the Commission, while the Cabinet of Ministers decided not to implement those recommendations.

The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the Petitioner and held that the Commission of Inquiry had acted beyond the scope of its lawful mandate by entertaining and investigating complaints made by persons who did not fall within the four categories specified in its terms of reference. The Court further held that the Commission had violated the principles of natural justice by failing to properly notify the Petitioner of the inquiries and, in particular, by denying her a reasonable and effective opportunity to be heard and to defend herself. The Court also found that the Commission had failed to comply with the mandatory procedural requirements contained in Sections 16 and 23 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, including the safeguards relating to legal representation and the observance of natural justice before making adverse findings. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the findings of the Commission were legally flawed, both because the Commission had acted outside its mandate and because the proceedings had been conducted in breach of mandatory legal and natural justice requirements.

June

CA HCC 0154/2023 (27.06.2025)

25(1)(b) of Debt Recovery Act

under Section 393(7) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, the Attorney General has the discretion to forward an indictment in respect of even summary offences to the High Court.

CA/PHC/APN 0024/2025 (23.06.2025)

The petitioner (2nd accused) was charged under Section 464 of the Penal Code read with Section 32. After trial, the Magistrate acquitted the petitioner of the third charge. However, the 1st accused, who was convicted on all charges, appealed to the High Court. During the High Court appeal, without any appeal against the petitioner’s acquittal, the High Court convicted the petitioner of the third charge on 14.06.2024.

It was held thst the conviction by the High Court was illegal, as the petitioner was not a party to the appeal and was not heard and there was no sanction from the AG to appeal against the acquittal.

CA/HCC/0047/2021 (27.06.2025)

The appellant was prosecuted in relation to suspected drugs allegedly recovered during a search conducted by prison officers. According to Prison Officer PW4, the detection took place on 29.12.2011 and the suspected heroin was recovered from the appellant’s waist. PW4 stated that he sealed the suspected heroin but did not weigh it at the time of detection. However, PW1, an officer of the Police Narcotics Bureau, gave evidence that PW4 and PW5 had weighed the drugs. A significant issue arose concerning the subsequent involvement of the Police Narcotics Bureau, as the Bureau only received information regarding the detection on 04.01.2012, several days after the prison officers had allegedly recovered and secured the production. The evidence therefore disclosed uncertainty as to when and by whom the suspected heroin was weighed, together with a delay in handing the production over to the Narcotics Bureau.

The Court regarded the delayed involvement of the Police Narcotics Bureau as highly irregular, particularly in a drug-related prosecution where the immediate, secure and properly documented handling of the production is essential. The Court further found deficiencies in the chain of custody, noting that PW4 had merely sealed the suspected heroin without weighing it or properly documenting its quantity at the time of recovery, and subsequently handed over the sealed production after a significant delay. The conflicting evidence as to whether and when the suspected heroin was weighed, coupled with the unexplained delay and lack of proper documentation, created serious concerns regarding the integrity, continuity and identity of the production. These deficiencies consequently affected the reliability of the prosecution evidence concerning the alleged heroin.

CA/PHC/APN/ CPA 019/25 (30.06.2024)

Prevention of Money Laundering Act

Police Officer can take possession of property even before freezing Order is issued under Section (12) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (Amendment) Act No 40 of 2021.

Nalaka Wickramasinghe Senanayake v. Marasinghe Pedige Thushara Kumarasiri, (CA/CPA/42/24 Decided on 13.09.2024) was not followed as it had not considered S. 12.

CA-HCC/138/2024 (13.06.2025)

The case in the High Court of Colombo (HC 2793/21) was for trial. On 17.11.2023, the High Court Judge acquitted the accused because an overnight witness was absent and the prosecution sought an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal held that the High Court Judge had no valid reason to acquit the accused. The Court found the order of acquittal to be untenable.

CPA/0108/2023 (25.06.2025)

Bribery

Accused was charge sheeted in MC by BC. BC subsequently withdrew the case due to non-sanction of whole commission. Later, the Accused was indicted on the same counts. Accused pleaded autrefois acquit

It was ruled that the MC discharged the Accused on technical ground and that the Accused was not ‘tried’ by the MC. Therefore,  no autrefois acquit arises.

 CA/MCR/04/2025 (30.06.2025)

Revision

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for revision because the petitioner failed to submit the relevant orders from the Magistrate’s Court with the petition thereby contravening Rule 3(1)(b) of the Court of Appeal (Appellate Procedure) Rules, 1990

SC SPL LA No. 301/2022  (4.06.2025)

The Supreme Court held that the failure to name all necessary parties in a writ application constituted a violation of Rule 04 and was not a mere technical or curable defect.

SC/APPEAL/104/2024 (03.06.2025)

Based on the police investigation and the Commission’s findings, the Attorney General filed an indictment in the High Court of Colombo against several individuals, including Ravi Karunanayake (the petitioner), who was named as the 2nd accused. The indictment included charges related to dishonest dealings of treasury bonds worth billions of rupees, causing financial loss to the government and public.

The petitioner sought a writ of certiorari from the Court of Appeal to quash the indictment and certain “decisions” made by the Commission of Inquiry against him. On 28.02.2023 the Court of Appeal quashed the indictment and information filed by the Attorney General but refused to quash the Commission’s “decisions”. AG Appealed.

Supreme Court’ Decisions

    • The judgment emphasizes the broad prosecutorial discretion vested in the Attorney General, highlighting that this discretion is “quasi-judicial” and involves a careful assessment of material to determine if a prosecution is warranted. The Attorney General is required to act independently and without external influence.
    • The Supreme Court noted that Section 24 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act allows the Attorney General to institute criminal proceedings based on material collected by a Commission of Inquiry. The Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s characterization of the Commission’s findings as mere “assertions” and not “determinations”. Even if they were “assertions,” they could still be considered as material for the Attorney General to decide on an indictment.
    • The Supreme Court stressed that while prosecutorial discretion is subject to judicial review, such intervention is “highly exceptional” and generally occurs only in cases of “grave abuse of power or a clear breach” of policy. The Court found that the Court of Appeal “overstepped the boundaries of its writ jurisdiction” by quashing the indictment based on insufficient material and evidence.
    • The Supreme Court judgment reverses the Court of Appeal’s decision to quash the indictment. It underscores that the Attorney General, after careful scrutiny, can rely on material from a Commission of Inquiry to bring charges, and courts should be highly reluctant to interfere with prosecutorial decisions unless there is clear evidence of bad faith, ulterior motive, or a manifest abuse of power

SC Appeal No. 159/23 (13.06.2025)

The Accused was charged under Section 345 of the Penal Code in relation to an allegation of sexual harassment involving the removal of the complainant’s undergarments. The High Court acquitted the Accused under Section 200, and the Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal. The Attorney General thereafter appealed to the Supreme Court. The prosecution relied, inter alia, on the presence of semen, which was confirmed through DNA evidence, while there was no direct evidence establishing that a sexual act had occurred or that the Accused had removed the complainant’s undergarments against her will.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and held that the prosecution had failed to establish a prima facie case warranting the calling of the defence. The Court held that an allegation under Section 345 involving the removal of undergarments requires proof of physical force and, importantly, the absence of consent, with the mental element of acting “against the consent or wishes” of the person being inherent in the offence and required to be established by the prosecution. The mere presence of semen, even where confirmed by DNA evidence, was insufficient by itself to establish a sexual offence or absence of consent, particularly in the absence of direct evidence of the alleged sexual act or the removal of the undergarments against the complainant’s will. The Court also rejected the medical examiner’s opinion that the complainant had fled a “life-threatening situation” as mere surmise and conjecture. Accordingly, the Court held that the High Court Judge was correct in declining to call for the defence, emphasizing that a criminal court cannot call upon an accused to establish a defence merely to fill gaps in the prosecution case, as the prosecution must first establish a prima facie case.

CA (PHC) 62/2020 (30.06.2025)

The alleged offence under the Food Act was detected on 22.10.2008. The original plaint was thereafter filed on 30.10.2008 against the Accused then named in the proceedings. Subsequently, by an amended plaint filed on 06.01.2011, the 3rd to 8th Accused, who were directors of Nestlé Lanka, were added as Accused. The validity of their inclusion therefore arose in the context of the statutory time limit prescribed by Section 20(1)(b) of the Food Act.

The Court held that Section 20(1)(b) of the Food Act prescribes a period of three months from the date of detection of the alleged offence within which proceedings must be instituted. Since the amended plaint adding the 3rd to 8th Accused was filed on 06.01.2011, more than two years after the offence was detected on 22.10.2008, their inclusion was clearly outside the prescribed three-month period. The Court accordingly held that the addition of the directors as Accused by the amended plaint violated the mandatory prescription requirement under Section 20(1)(b) of the Food Act.

SC Contempt No: 01 / 2021 (16.06.2025)

(Nagananda Kodithuwakku)

The Court found no merit in the Respondent’s challenge to its jurisdiction under Article 105(3) of the Constitution. The contention that the absence of a statutory definition or legislated procedure renders the Court powerless to address contempt is inconsistent with the Constitution’s language and long-standing judicial understanding

Excellent literature on SC power on Contempt

    • The Court stated that the power of superior courts to punish for contempt has historically derived from common law, not from a codified definition. The absence of an express constitutional or statutory definition does not diminish this authority.
    • The Contempt of a Court, Tribunal or Institution Act, No. 8 of 2024, enacted after the objections were raised, does not derogate from or affect the Supreme Court’s powers under Article 105(3) of the Constitution
    • The Supreme Court has consistently exercised the power to punish for contempt independently of statutory codification. This power is inherent in the Court’s constitutional mandate.
    • The judgment references the 1874 case of in re John Ferguson, which established that the Supreme Court of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) has all the powers for punishing contempt, wherever committed in the Island, as possessed by the Superior Courts of Westminster. This inherent power extends beyond acts committed in the face of the Court.
    • The Court emphasized that Article 105(3) of the Sri Lankan Constitution constitutionally embodies this inherent jurisdiction, removing the necessity for specific contempt legislation.
    • While the Contempt of a Court, Tribunal or Institution Act, No. 8 of 2024, now makes contempt both a common law and written law offence, the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Article 105 continues to exist independently.
    • The Court held that Superior Courts of Record can adopt their own procedures for contempt inquiries, provided they adhere to fundamental safeguards of a fair trial: a definite charge, the right to be heard, and the right to mount a defense.

SC/FR/218/2013 (16.06.2025)

This addresses whether the refusal to issue a National Identity Card (NIC) recognizing a woman’s status as “Bhikkhuni” (Buddhist nun) violates her right to equal treatment under Article 12(1) of the Constitution

The Court declared that the 1st Respondent infringed the Petitioners’ rights under Article 12(1) of the Constitution and directed the 1st Respondent to issue the 1st Petitioner’s National Identity Card recognizing her status as a Bhikkhuni.

S.C. Appeal No. 88/2024 (4.06.2025)

The Plaintiff, Athauda Arachchige Patrine Dilrukshi Dias Wickremasinghe, instituted an action in the District Court of Colombo (DMR/3675/21) claiming Rs. 1 billion in damages against the 1st to 8th Defendants, members of the Public Service Commission (PSC), including Dr. Prathap Ramanujam, the 2nd Defendant-Petitioner-Appellant. The Plaintiff alleged that, while exercising disciplinary powers over her as a public servant, the PSC members had acted negligently, wrongfully, illegally, ultra vires and mala fide, thereby breaching their duty of care and causing harm to her career, entitlements and professional life. She had been interdicted and subsequently placed on compulsory leave by the PSC. The District Court overruled a preliminary objection to its jurisdiction based on Article 61A of the Constitution. The 2nd Defendant appealed to the High Court of Civil Appeal, which granted leave to proceed but refused interim relief to stay the District Court proceedings. Both the 2nd Defendant and the Plaintiff thereafter sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which was granted on the common legal question whether the Plaintiff could maintain the action in view of Article 61A.

Article 61A provides that no court or tribunal shall inquire into or question any order or decision made by the PSC, or a committee or officer of the PSC, in the exercise of powers conferred by law. The Plaintiff contended that Article 61A provides only “qualified immunity” and therefore does not protect decisions alleged to have been made mala fide. The Defendants, on the other hand, contended that Article 61A constitutes a constitutional “ouster clause” which removes the jurisdiction of ordinary courts to inquire into PSC decisions, irrespective of allegations of mala fides. The Supreme Court examined the history, purpose and language of Article 61A, together with the relevant jurisprudence, and considered whether the provision operated as a personal immunity for PSC members or as a limitation upon the jurisdiction of courts.

The Supreme Court held in favour of the 2nd Defendant-Appellant and classified Article 61A as a constitutional ouster clause, rather than an immunity provision. The Court held that Article 61A removes the jurisdiction of courts, including the District Court and Court of Appeal, to review decisions of the PSC made in the exercise of its lawful powers, while judicial review is channelled through the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and, where applicable, the Supreme Court under Article 126 in respect of fundamental rights. The Court held that the marginal note referring to “immunity” was not determinative of the constitutional meaning of the provision and that the ouster of jurisdiction applied even where mala fide conduct was alleged. Accordingly, the District Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiff’s delictual action founded upon decisions of the PSC. The Court also noted that the Plaintiff had already pursued her remedy before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and succeeded there, and therefore the District Court proceedings could not be maintained.

July

CA HCC 0084/24 (18.07.2025)

Three charges of rape against a minor, between October 1, 2014, and September 30, 2015.

Grounds of Appeal

The appellant’s counsel argued two main grounds for appeal:

    • The evidence of the prosecution witnesses lacked credibility and consistency.
    • The High Court Judge had rejected the defense’s evidence on unreasonable grounds.

Court of Appeal’s Analysis and Decision

    • The Court of Appeal focused on the credibility of the prosecution’s main witness, PW01. The judgment highlights “striking discrepancies” between PW01’s court testimony and the account she gave to the Judicial Medical Officer (PW08). Specifically, her statement to the doctor indicated that the sexual abuse occurred on “several occasions,” including the insertion of the appellant’s penis into her rectum and mouth, and that these incidents happened in the afternoon. This directly contradicted her court testimony, where she stated the incident happened only once, in the early morning.
    • The court found that these inconsistencies were not adequately explained by factors such as her age or the time elapsed since the events. The judgment states that these lapses in detail could not be dismissed as mere errors, and raised substantial concerns about the reliability of her testimony.

CA HCC 0012/24, (31.07. 2025)

Two charges of grave sexual abuse against a minor under the age of 16.

A key point of the appeal was the High Court judge’s order on January 31, 2020, to remand the appellant following the testimony of the first witness (PW01). The Court of Appeal found that the High Court judge failed to provide adequate justification for revoking the appellant’s bail and remanding him, which is a requirement under the Code of Criminal Procedure Act. This omission was seen as potentially punitive and was found to have deprived the appellant of his right to a fair trial, particularly as it led to a change in legal counsel and challenges in preparing a defense.

Re-trial ordered 

CA (PHC) 211/201 (31.07. 2025)

The Assistant Commissioner of Labour initiated proceedings in the Magistrate’s Court of Gampaha, filing a charge sheet under the Termination of Employment Workmen (Special Provision) Act, No. 45 of 1971.

On 25.11.2011, the Magistrate’s Court convicted Jewel Arts Limited and ordered the company to pay the full amount of over Rs. 100 million, based on admissions made by an attorney-at-law representing the company.

The Court of Appeal found that the initial proceedings in the Magistrate’s Court were flawed for several reasons:

    • The Assistant Commissioner of Labour failed to file a certificate or determination as required by the law; they only filed a charge sheet.
    • A plea in a criminal case must be made by a responsible officer of a juristic person, not by an attorney-at-law. The Magistrate’s conviction was based solely on an admission by the company’s attorney.
    • The court emphasized that a penal statute, like the one in this case, must be interpreted strictly, and if there’s any doubt, it should favor the person being penalized.

S.C. Appeal No. 37/2018 (18.07.2025)

Supreme Court addressed whether the Commissioner General of Labour (CGOL) could revisit a final order they had previously issued. The court decided on that an administrative body like the CGOL generally cannot rescind or vary its own decisions, with some exceptions.

The court’s decision was based on several key principles of administrative law, including the importance of finality, legal certainty, and the functus officio doctrine. This doctrine, which has roots in Roman law, holds that a body loses its authority to change a decision after it has performed its duty and the decision is final and valid.

The Supreme Court outlined specific circumstances under which an administrative or executive body may revisit its decision. These exceptions include:

    • Where an express statutory power exists to amend or revoke the decision.
    • When the decision is unperfected, meaning it has not been made final, such as by being formally communicated to the parties involved.
    • When the decision was based on a fundamental mistake of fact.
    • When the decision was obtained by fraud.

In this specific case, the court determined that the CGOL’s decision was not based on a fundamental mistake of fact and was not obtained by fraud. Therefore, the CGOL did not have the authority to revisit or vary it.

The Supreme Court, therefore, set aside the Court of Appeal’s judgment and issued several writs to enforce its decision. These included a Writ of Certiorari to quash the decision to reopen the inquiry, a Writ of Prohibition to prevent any further inquiries, and a Writ of Mandamus to compel the CGOL to take action to recover the sums awarded to the petitioners.

SC Rule No. 04/2024 (24.07.2025)

The complaint detailed several allegations of misconduct against the respondent Attorneys-at-Law, including:

    • The respondent was accused of acting fraudulently to facilitate a property transfer for the complainant by entering into an agreement to sell.
    • He failed to execute the agreement to sell in accordance with the Notaries Ordinance.
    • The respondent fraudulently obtained money from the complainant, who believed he had entered into a valid agreement.
    • The complainant paid a total agreed amount in installments between February 7, 2003, and February 25, 2006, and later paid an additional fee for a deed of transfer.
    • The respondent, as a Notary Public, knowingly facilitated the transfer of the same property to another person, Kaluhath Thabrew Linton, via Deed No. 296, dated 13.11.2012, even though the complainant had paid in full.

The Respondent was struck off the Roll of Attorneys-at-Law. He is permanently barred from notarial practice.

SC/FR/246/2022,
SC/FR/261/2022,
SC/FR/262/2022,
SC/FR/274/2022, and
SC/FR/276/2022 (23.07.2025)

The core issue was the legality of the proclamation of a state of emergency and the subsequent emergency regulations issued in July 2022 by the then-Acting President, Ranil Wickremasinghe, in response to widespread public protests, known as the “Aragalaya”.

    • Public protests began in early 2022 due to a severe economic and financial crisis.
    • The protests culminated on 09.07.2022, with demonstrators occupying the President’s official residence and the Presidential Secretariat, and setting fire to the Prime Minister’s private residence.
    • On 17.07.2022, the Acting President declared a state of emergency under the Public Security Ordinance (PSO), which was challenged by the petitioners.

Petitioners’ Arguments

    • The petitioners argued that the state of emergency was declared without justification and that the ground situation as of 17.07.2022, did not warrant such a measure.
    • They claimed the proclamation was an abuse of power and was made for political reasons to suppress dissent and protests.
    • They also challenged the emergency regulations, arguing they were overbroad, unconstitutional, and infringed upon fundamental rights.

Court’s Majority Opinion and Conclusion

The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Yasantha Kodagoda, PC, held that the Acting President’s decision to declare a state of emergency was illegal and a nullity. The court’s reasoning was based on the following:

    • The court was “hamstrung” because the Attorney General did not provide an affidavit from the Acting President explaining his reasons for the decision.
    • Without a clear, reason-based explanation, the court concluded that the decision to issue the proclamation was not made with due diligence, was unreasonable, arbitrary, and an abuse of power. The court found no evidence of a “public emergency” that could not have been dealt with using existing laws, such as calling out the armed forces or imposing a curfew.
    • The court asserted its jurisdiction to review the President’s actions, stating that while subjective language is used in the law, a court can engage in objective judicial review if a decision is found to be unreasonable or arbitrary.

Dissenting Opinion

Justice Arjuna Obeyesekere provided a dissenting opinion.

    • His Lordship observed that, from an objective standpoint, there was an “unprecedented state of public emergency” on 17 July, 2022, and that the Acting President’s opinion was rational and reasonable.
    • His Lordship further stated that it was not the court’s duty to re-evaluate the incidents but to determine if the President’s state of mind was reasonable, in good faith, and on proper grounds. He concluded that the fundamental rights of the petitioners were not infringed by the proclamation

August

CA HCC 64/2018 (decided on 29.08.2025)

The Appellant challenged both conviction and sentence, arguin errors in charges combining section 20(a) (offering gratification) and 20(b) (solicitation/acceptance) of the Bribery Act. However, the Court ruled the joinder of charges was not material under Section 166, Code of Criminal Procedure, since no prejudice was caused to the accused.

Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the Prosecution had failed to prove ownership of the bus by PW02 or appellant’s ability to influence the issue of a permit i.e Prosecution did not establish that PW02 was the registered owner of the bus and no cogent evidence showed the appellant had authority or ability to procure or influence issuance of the permit (only linked to a CTB regional office).

Appeal allowed.

CA/HCC/0016/2021 (29.08.2025)

343.08g of drugs.

Key independent witness (man who picked up and threw back the alleged heroin parcel) had  not been called.

CA/HCC/0195/23 (07.08.2025)

Grave Sexual Abuse

The court noted that while in-camera proceedings are permissible in cases involving minors, the trial judge held the proceedings in his chambers, a different and less formal setting, without any medical report to support the decision. The judge also postponed the trial for nearly a year without a plausible reason, which prejudiced the appellant

Additionally, the court highlighted that the prosecution’s failure to call the victim’s elder brother as a witness was a critical error. The brother was identified by both the victim and her mother as a key eyewitness who first reported the incident. The court cited legal precedent emphasizing the need for the prosecution to call all essential witnesses to “unfold the narrative” of the case. The court found that without the brother’s testimony, the victim’s evidence was uncorroborated, inconsistent, and not credible, failing to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.

CPA/106/2024 (07.08.2025)

This case arose from an application challenging the order of the High Court of Colombo dated 05.01.2024 in HCB/179/2022, by which the accused, Delwakkada Liyanage Chandrapala and Vimalasena Rubasinghe, were discharged and the indictment against them was rejected. The 1st Accused, Chandrapala, had been indicted for corruption allegedly committed while serving as Director-General of the National Rupavahini Corporation between 16.12.2014 and 15.01.2015, while the 2nd Accused, Rubasinghe, was charged with aiding and abetting. Earlier, the Commission had directed criminal proceedings against them in the Magistrates’ Court in Case No. 74173/01/17 on 07.07.2017 in respect of the same offences. During those proceedings, the accused challenged the maintainability of the case on the ground that the Commission had not collectively directed the institution of proceedings. Relying on a Supreme Court judgment, the Director-General withdrew the case, and the Magistrate permitted the withdrawal under Section 189 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act and acquitted the accused on 27.07.2021. The accused subsequently raised the earlier acquittal as a preliminary objection to the High Court indictment, contending that they had already been acquitted of the same charges, and the High Court upheld the objection and discharged them.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the earlier proceedings amounted to the accused having been “tried” within the meaning of Section 314 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, which prohibits a person from being tried twice for the same offence. Referring to SC Appeal No. 12 A/2009, the Court held that for an accused to be regarded as having been “tried” for the purposes of Section 314, both the prosecution and the defence must have had an opportunity to present their evidence. In the present case, the prosecution had withdrawn the Magistrates’ Court case following the preliminary objection before the trial had been completed and before both parties had an opportunity to lead their evidence. The Magistrate’s acquittal therefore lacked the necessary evidential foundation and did not constitute a prior “trial” within the meaning of Section 314. The Court of Appeal accordingly held that the High Court Judge had been misdirected in discharging the accused, set aside the order dated 05.01.2024, dismissed the accused’s objection to the indictment, and directed the High Court to restore the case and proceed with the trial to its conclusion.

CA HCC 26/2025 (29.08.2025)

In the case of Daraniyagalage Chularathne v. The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Court of Appeal overturned a High Court judgment that had convicted the accused of grave sexual abuse against a minor. The original conviction, dated April 4, 2023, sentenced the accused to seven years of rigorous imprisonment, a fine of Rs. 5,000, and ordered him to pay Rs. 150,000 in compensation.

The appeal was based on several grounds, including the claim that the High Court Judge failed to consider inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimony of the main prosecution witness, referred to as PW 1. The Court of Appeal found that the High Court Judge did not properly evaluate the evidence, noting that contradictions in the victim’s testimony “strike at the very root of the case”.

Key inconsistencies highlighted in the judgment included:

    • The victim’s conflicting accounts of the incident’s timing, specifically whether it occurred after school or later that morning.
    • The victim’s conflicting statements about his physical position during the alleged abuse—he testified that he was standing, but the Judicial Medical Officer’s (JMO) report indicated he had described the incident as having occurred while he was in a sleeping position.

The Court of Appeal’s judgment referenced the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. M.K. Anthony which advises that while minor discrepancies do not warrant the rejection of evidence, major contradictions that touch the core of the case can be problematic. The court determined that the contradictions in PW 1’s testimony were not trivial and raised substantial doubt about the prosecution’s case.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeal concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based solely on the victim’s evidence. As a result, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the accused was acquitted of all charges.

 CA/HCC/0077/2023 (28.08.2025)

Rathnapalake Hemashiri Subasinghe appealed against his conviction and sentence for the rape of a minor. The appellant was initially indicted in 2015 and convicted in 2016, but the Court of Appeal set aside that conviction and ordered a retrial. The retrial commenced in 2019 and, on 09.10.2020, the High Court of Vavuniya convicted the appellant and imposed 12 years’ rigorous imprisonment, together with a fine of Rs. 10,000 and compensation of Rs. 300,000. Before the High Court, the appellant had not been afforded an opportunity to make submissions in mitigation, and consequently the Court did not take into account the substantial period he had already spent in remand custody. In the appeal, his counsel challenged only the length of the sentence and not the conviction.

The Court of Appeal considered the amended Section 333 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, which empowers the Court to take into account the period an accused has spent in custody prior to conviction when determining whether a sentence is manifestly excessive or unjust, thereby avoiding the effective double punishment of an accused. The Court noted that the appellant had been in remand custody from 23.11.2016 to 02.04.2020 and again from the date of his conviction on 09.10.2020, amounting to approximately eight years in custody. Taking into account this period and the fact that the appellant had no previous convictions, the Court considered it appropriate to deduct eight years from the 12-year sentence. The appeal was therefore partly allowed, the term of rigorous imprisonment was reduced to four years with effect from the date of conviction, while the orders imposing the Rs. 10,000 fine and Rs. 300,000 compensation remained unchanged.

CA/INJ/07/2023 (28/08/2025.)

The case arose from an application under Article 143 of the Constitution seeking injunctive relief, with a subsequent motion filed under Section 9 of the Contempt of a Court, Tribunal or Institution Act against several parties for allegedly violating an interim order. The Petitioners, Sherrene Wijeyaratne and Patience Christabel Fernando, were depositors of Golden Key Credit Card Company Ltd. (GKCCCL) and had also been parties to SC (FR) 191/2009, in which the Supreme Court had held that a petitioner-respondent and her daughters had no valid shareholding or directorship in the relevant respondent companies and directed that the shares be transferred to a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) for the purpose of settling depositors’ funds. The SPV was subsequently dissolved and its assets transferred to GKCCCL. The Petitioners alleged that the Respondents had unlawfully acquired properties belonging to GKCCCL in violation of Supreme Court orders. In CA/INJ/07/2023, ex parte interim orders were issued on 01.12.2024, including an order restraining the Respondents from “receiving benefits” from the assets of the 1st to 3rd Respondent Companies and the Sicille Kotelawala Trust. The Petitioners thereafter filed a contempt motion under Section 9 against Mithuro Café (Pvt) Ltd., Nirosha Priyadarshanie Daundage, Daundage Asela Sanjeewa and Kaburawala Withanaga Nimantha Shehan Withanage, alleging breach of interim order C(iv). The Contemnor-Respondents contended that the order was vague and excessively broad, that the contempt summons had been issued without proper notice, and that the Court possessed inherent jurisdiction to recall the summons.

The Court confined its determination to whether the contempt summons ought to be recalled and emphasized that a contempt proceeding requires the establishment of a prima facie case, a clear and unambiguous charge and a fair opportunity for the alleged contemnor to respond. The Court found that the relevant interim orders were “ambiguous and not precise” and noted that, on 15.12.2023, counsel for the Respondents had already given an undertaking not to alienate the properties or shares, thereby affecting the scope and operation of the interim orders. The Court further held that serving the contempt summons on the same day on which the ex parte rule was issued, on 12.03.2025, was contrary to the requirements of natural justice and procedural fairness. On the material before it, the Court concluded that no prima facie case of contempt had been established. The Court also emphasized the importance of the mental element in contempt proceedings, observing that a person cannot properly be held in contempt unless it is established that the person had the ability to comply with the order allegedly breached. Accordingly, the Court considered the failure to establish that the Contemnor-Respondents were capable of complying with the relevant order as further grounds supporting the recall of the contempt summons.

C.A. Appeal No: CA(PHC) 54/2021 (27.08.2025)

The Appellant, Wellakke Liyanage Rasika Niroshana Liyanage, appealed against the High Court judgment dated 06.08.2021 dismissing his application under Section 24 of the Protection of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act No. 28 of 1996. He claimed to have been disabled since 1993 and alleged that he had been discriminated against in the recruitment examination for the Sri Lanka Administrative Service conducted in 2004/2005. Although he obtained 135 marks, he failed to reach the prescribed cut-off. His claim was based principally on Circular No. 27/88, which provided for 3% of government vacancies to be filled by persons with disabilities. He alleged that the failure to recruit him amounted to discrimination on the basis of his disability.

The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Circular No. 27/88 applied only to candidates possessing the requisite qualifications, and the Appellant’s failure to reach the qualifying cut-off meant that his non-recruitment resulted from insufficient merit rather than disability discrimination; any interpretation allowing an otherwise unqualified candidate to be recruited merely because of disability would lead to an absurd result. The Court further held that his 16-year delay in challenging the examination results was extraordinarily long and unexplained, disentitling him to equitable relief on the ground of laches. The Appellant also failed to establish that he fell within the statutory definition of a “person with disability” under Section 37 of the Act, as the medical evidence merely identified a minor spinal protrusion which did not impair his mobility or ability to attend to his basic needs, and his counsel conceded the insufficiency of the evidence. Finally, there was no evidence of improper bias, discriminatory intent or any other prohibited conduct by the selection authorities under Section 23 of the Act.

September

CA/CPA/103/2024 (19.09.2025)

The petitioner, an Army Corporal, was charged before the Walasmulla Magistrate’s Court (Case No. 84237) for possession of 10 grams of Cannabis Sativa under Section 78(5) of the Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance. pleaded guilty on 08.04.2024 and was fined Rs. 8,000/-, with a two-month default imprisonment. On 16.04.2024, his counsel requested to convert the fine to State costs because the fine could jeopardize his army career, but the Magistrate refused since the case was already concluded. The High Court of Tangalle (HCRA 11/2024) dismissed his revision application.

Decision of the Court of Appeal.

    • The High Court had wrongly assumed that State costs under Section 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act can be imposed only if the accused is not convicted, which was a misdirection in law.
    • The precedents establish that courts have discretion to convert fines into State costs even after a finding of guilt.
    • The petitioner had served 22 years in the Army with an unblemished record, and the fine (not the conviction) would result in loss of employment, pension, and other benefits, severely impacting his livelihood and family.
    • Citing Geegana Gamage Chamara Nilanga v. AG (CA HCC/112/2020), the Court noted that justice must consider both sides — the punishment should not cause disproportionate hardship.
    • Fine converted to Sate Cost

CA/COC/19/2023 (23.09.2025)
CA/COC 26/2024 (02.09.2025)
CA/COC/0007/2022  (23.09.2025)

Considering the evidence given by both parties, it is very clear that the Petitioner has established beyond reasonable doubt that the Respondents have wilfully and deliberately violated the undertaking given to the Commercial High Court of Westen Province (Exercising Civil Jurisdiction) holden in Colombo on 09.06.2020.

CA/HCC/0101/2022 (03.09.2025)

In this case a serious misdirection by the learned High Court Judge had caused great prejudice to the Appellant. Before the prosecution could conclude the evidence of PW1, he had gone missing without a trace. After a lengthy inquiry the learned High Court Judge had allowed the prosecution to mark the non-summary deposition of PW1 and to continue the case.

Although the learned High Court Judge, in her judgment had mentioned that the evidence given by PW1 is incomplete, she had acted on that incomplete deposition to convict the Appellant and pass the sentence

Hence, the Court concluded that the evidence given by PW1 at the non-summary inquiry is incomplete and cannot be considered to make a case against the Appellant

DSG was also of the view that the learned High Court Judge has wrongfully adopted the evidence given by PW1 at the non-summary inquiry under Section 33 of the Evidence Ordinance

Appeal allowed

CA (PHC) APN 0022/2025  (11.09.2025)

75.130 grams of drugs, bail granted by Cout of Appeal, absconded, apprehended and the bail was cancelled by High Court.

The Petitioner filed the current revision application with the Court of Appeal to have the High Court’s orders denying his subsequent bail applications set aside and to be granted bail.

The Petitioner’s counsel contended that the High Court’s orders were illegal because the Petitioner had been detained in custody for more than 12 months, which should trigger the provisions of section 5 of the Poisons, Opium, and Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act No. 41 of 2022.

The Learned State Counsel argued that the Amendment Act, which was certified on 23.11.2022, should not be applied retroactively because the Petitioner’s arrest occurred in 2018, prior to its enactment.

The Court affirmed the legal principle that new substantive laws do not have retroactive effect unless explicitly stated, and the absence of such a provision in the Amendment Act suggests it is not applicable to situations that arose before its enactment.    

Crucially, the Court also noted that the Petitioner had been granted bail by the Court of Appeal previously on the condition that he must present himself in Court when directed. The Court found that the Petitioner had breached this condition by absconding, and the justifications put forth for his absence were “neither cogent nor convincing”.

CPA 0037/2025 (30.09.2025)

The 1st Respondent submitted an indictment in the High Court of Colombo against the Petitioner and the 2nd Accused. On 26.09.2023, the Director General of the Bribery Commission (1st Respondent) informed the High Court that the virtual complainant (PW01) was disabled and unable to testify due to medical issues.

The 1st Respondent then requested permission from the Court to drop the charges related to the solicitation of a gratification and proceed to trial solely on the charges of accepting a gratification against the Petitioner, and the aiding and abetting charges against the 2nd Accused.

The Petitioner objected to this request, arguing that: calling the evidence of PW02 (the decoy) prior to PW01 (the virtual complainant) would cause grave injustice and violate the fundamental right to a fair trial and the testimony of the witness who is the sole and primary source of the bribery allegation (PW01) and whose account is to be corroborated must be led first.

The High Court Judge overruled the Petitioner’s objections in an order dated February 10, 2025.

The Court of Appeal emphasized the critical and interdependent nature of the virtual complainant’s (PW01) and the decoy’s (PW02) testimony. The decoy only observes the accused accepting a gratification, but the purpose behind the solicitation is known solely to the virtual complainant (PW01). If the virtual complainant does not testify, the decoy’s or investigator’s testimony regarding the acceptance of the gratification lacks completeness. Specifically, any assertions by the decoy or investigator concerning the purpose of the gratification become hearsay and are therefore inadmissible in court. A decoy’s testimony by definition helps substantiate bribery allegations, but for it to hold weight, there must be prior testimony, typically from the virtual complainant. The virtual complainant’s testimony provides the necessary context and foundation upon which the decoy’s evidence can corroborate the allegations, especially those related to the specific purposes outlined in section 19(b) of the Bribery Act. The absence of this initial testimony creates a gap in the evidential chain. Both testimonies work in tandem to form a comprehensive narrative that can stand up in court, underscoring the interdependence of their accounts.

Accordingly, the Court held that the prosecution (1st Respondent) cannot continue the proceedings of the High Court case (HCB 83/2021) without leading the evidence of the virtual complainant (PW01).

CA CPA 113/2024 (23.09.2025)

Right to Prosecution – S. 456 of the CCPA

The offences were allegedly committed on 17.05.2002, and a complaint was made to the Wennappuwa Police on the same day. An indictment dated 28.01.2022 was initially forwarded to the High Court of Negombo (HC 61/2022), but it was subsequently discovered that the offences fell within the judicial zone of Chilaw. Accordingly, on 14.11.2022, the Negombo High Court Judge ordered the indictment to be returned to the Attorney General, who prepared and signed a fresh indictment on 15.09.2023 and forwarded it to the High Court of Chilaw (HC 63/23). The Petitioners raised a preliminary objection under Section 456 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, contending that the right of prosecution had expired. The High Court rejected the objection.

The principal issue before the Court of Appeal was when the “right of prosecution” commences for the purposes of Section 456. Counsel for the Petitioners argued that prosecution commences only when the accused is brought before the High Court and the indictment and its annexes are formally presented. Counsel for the Respondent contended that prosecution commences when information concerning the commission of an offence is provided to a police officer or inquirer. The Court considered Section 456 and the earlier decision in Queen v. Don Louis (1863), which interpreted the expression “right of prosecution” as the right to commence a prosecution, and held that under the present Code of Criminal Procedure Act No. 15 of 1979, the function previously performed by a Justice of the Peace under Ordinance No. 15 of 1843 is now initiated through the provision of information to a police officer or inquirer under Section 109.

The Court held that, for the purposes of Section 456, the right of prosecution commences when information, orally or in writing, concerning the commission of an offence is given to a police officer or inquirer under Section 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act. Since the complaint in the present case was made to the Wennappuwa Police on 17.05.2002, the prosecution was commenced on that date, well within the statutory period of twenty years applicable to offences other than murder, treason and offences subject to special limitation provisions. The subsequent return of the original indictment due to the jurisdictional issue and the filing of the fresh indictment in the High Court of Chilaw did not extinguish the right of prosecution. Accordingly, the Court held that the prosecution under HC 63/23 was not time-barred.

SC Appeal No. 62/2025  (19.09.2025)

The Officer-in-Charge of the Pulmoddai Police Station and the Attorney General appealed against the Court of Appeal judgment dated 01.04.2024 concerning a vehicle bearing No. SGPH 4430, of which Siyaptha Finance PLC claimed absolute ownership. On 12.12.2016, nine suspects were arrested for excavating in the Elandamunei Conservation Forest, using the said vehicle. The 1st Accused was the registered owner and was in possession and control of the vehicle, while Siyaptha Finance PLC was the absolute owner. The accused were charged under the Forest Ordinance for trespassing and digging soil in a conservation forest and under the Antiquities Ordinance for excavation for the discovery of antiquities. All nine accused pleaded guilty on 11.01.2017 and were sentenced. When Siyaptha Finance PLC claimed the vehicle, the Magistrate refused the claim and ordered its confiscation, which was affirmed by the Provincial High Court of Trincomalee. The Court of Appeal subsequently reversed those orders and directed that the vehicle be released to Siyaptha Finance PLC, giving rise to the present appeal.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Court of Appeal judgment and affirmed the Magistrate’s order dated 23.08.2017. The Court held that the vehicle had been used by the accused to gain access to the Conservation Forest and thereby facilitate the offence of trespass, as established by the B Report and the accused’s own pleas of guilt. For the purposes of Section 40(1) of the Forest Ordinance, the Court held that Siyaptha Finance PLC, despite being the absolute owner in terms of its financing arrangement, could not be regarded as the “owner” contemplated by the provision because it had no control or possession of the vehicle. The registered owner, who had control and possession and had pleaded guilty, could not rely on the proviso protecting an owner who had taken reasonable precautions to prevent the offence. The Court further held that the claimant was estopped from belatedly challenging the jurisdiction of the Magistrate or the validity of the charge sheet, having raised no such objection during the original inquiry. Accordingly, the questions of law were answered in the affirmative, the Court of Appeal having erroneously interpreted Section 40 of the Forest Ordinance.

SC/Contempt/03/2025 (23.09.2025)

The case concerned contempt proceedings against Illukpitiyage Srinath Harshadewa Jayasena Illukpitiya, Controller General of Immigration and Emigration, for allegedly willfully disobeying the fourth interim order issued by the Supreme Court on 02.08.2024 in SC FR Nos. 203, 204 and 205/2024. The order required him to maintain the status quo ante as at 16.04.2024 by reactivating the previously existing Electronic Travel Authorization (ETA) system, pending proceedings concerning the introduction of a new E-visa system. Although he complied with the first three interim orders, he maintained that the fourth order was “legally and practically impossible” to implement.

After hearing evidence on 13.09.2024, the Court was satisfied prima facie that the Accused had committed contempt and issued Rule on 25.09.2024. At the inquiry on 01.07.2025, he withdrew his initial plea of not guilty and pleaded guilty. In mitigation, he claimed that he had acted under pressure and on instructions from a superior administrative officer not to comply with the order pending advice from the Attorney General’s Department. However, the Court found no documentary or other corroboration of these assertions from either the Attorney General or the alleged superior officer and concluded that the Accused had adopted a deceptive approach before the Court.

The Court held that the willful disobedience constituted contempt of court under the Contempt of a Court, Tribunal or Institution Act No. 08 of 2024. Having considered the circumstances, the Court determined that the appropriate sentence was three years’ imprisonment. However, crediting the approximately one year already spent in remand custody since 25.09.2024, the Court reduced the effective sentence to two years’ imprisonment, to commence forthwith.

S.C. (FR) No. 313/2020 (18.09.2025)

Sriramachandran Thanikumar, Attorney-at-Law, filed a fundamental rights application under Articles 17 and 126 on behalf of Kumarasamy Manoharan, a German national of Sri Lankan origin detained at Tangalle Old Prison by the Terrorist Investigation Division (TID). The application alleged violations of Articles 11, 12(1), 13(1) and 13(2), together with a claim for Rs. 50 million in compensation. The Court granted leave on 01.02.2022 under Articles 12(1), 13(1) and 13(2), but not Article 11.

It was alleged that Manoharan, a diabetic suffering from kidney disease and employed as a caregiver in Germany, was arrested in Batticaloa on or about 04.03.2020 without being informed of the reason and subsequently transferred to the TID and Tangalle Prison without lawful procedure or a valid detention order. The Petitioner alleged that financial assistance given by Manoharan to poor persons in Sri Lanka had been wrongly treated as funding for terrorist activities, and that access by counsel was repeatedly denied or restricted. Allegations were also made of physical assault, forced confession, deprivation of basic necessities, solitary confinement in degrading conditions and inadequate medical care.

The Respondents maintained that Manoharan was arrested under Section 6(1) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) following investigations and intelligence concerning financial transactions allegedly intended to support the reorganization of a proscribed organization. They stated that he was informed of the reason for arrest, provided with arrest notes, produced before the Magistrate as required, and that detention orders dated 07.03.2020 were lawfully issued under Section 9(1) of the PTA. The Court found no credible material establishing that the detention orders were fabricated, fraudulent or ultra vires. It also noted that credible intelligence-based suspicion may suffice under the broader arrest powers conferred by the PTA. The Court further found that the detainee had failed to produce material establishing that his financial transactions were genuinely for charitable purposes.

Manoharan was produced before the Colombo Magistrate on 18.05.2021, remanded and subsequently indicted for alleged terrorist activities. The Respondents maintained that family and legal access had been provided. In considering the legality of the arrest and detention, the Court held that the matter must be assessed through proportionality and the standard of reasonable suspicion. While mere association or travel history may not justify arrest, the Court held that credible intelligence-based suspicion may suffice under the PTA, while emphasizing that a balance must nevertheless be maintained between national security interests and constitutional safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention.

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